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Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0? Digital Service Providers as Cyber-
Social Systems  
NIZAN GESLEVICH PACKIN*
The security of communication networks and databases has become a main ele-
ment of national security and economic competitiveness. Constant growth in infor-
mation systems, financial technology, and e-commerce has improved efficiency and 
pushed economic growth. This growth has also made our society dependent on net-
worked digital technologies and digital structures and devices, which facilitate, en-
hance, and scale most modern human endeavors. Consequently, the biggest digital 
service providers have become omnipotent, critical players in our economy that op-
erate essential services and control how and where data is collected, stored, and 
handled. Recent attacks on information infrastructures such as the U.S. election sys-
tem, which was designated a Critical Infrastructure in need of protection in 2017, as 
well as security breaches at institutions including key digital service providers, have 
caused concerns about these institutions’ stability and standing. The breaches 
showed that in addition to a technical solution, a system-wide approach is needed to 
address these issues.  
One particularly important aspect of such an approach relates to the elevated 
probability of some kind of failure, or disastrous malfunctioning, of key digital ser-
vice providers—their services or their products—as a result of cyberattacks. This 
Article focuses on such potential failures or malfunctionings of nonfinancial institu-
tions and of omnipotent, global digital service providers in particular, a scenario 
referred to here as “Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0,” by way of an analogy to financial failures 
that can cause massive damage to society. The Article sheds light on this relatively 
unappreciated risk by comparing it to the (i) attempts of the Dodd-Frank Act to stop 
financial institutions from shifting the risks of too-big-to-fail externalities to society 
and (ii) laws protecting Critical Infrastructures. The Article is also greatly inspired 
by a recent European Union (EU) directive that deals with digital service providers. 
The Article serves as a call for action, arguing that, based on these comparisons and 
recent regulation, as well as other factors, key digital service providers should be 
defined as “Critical Service Providers” given their importance to our economy and 
society, and need to improve their risk management.  
The Article explains why addressing Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0 has not yet become a 
political and societal priority. First, digital service providers are technology com-
panies, which, many believe, are shaped by market forces such that they fail and 
succeed in equal measure without producing negative ripple effects on the economy 
or society. Second, technology giants are not as carefully regulated as banks because 
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unlike banks, they do not take insured deposits backed by the government. Third, 
even heavily regulated financial institutions have not been required until recently to 
focus on cybersecurity. Finally, some believe that there is no point in worrying about 
Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0 as it is difficult to prepare for theoretical unknowns. Despite 
these arguments, however, the Article contends that given the factors outlined in the 
Critical Service Provider list of criteria, such as size, business involvement in multi-
ple industry sectors, and impact on technology, the economy, and cyber-social sys-
tems, Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0 is a valid concern.  
Recognizing this problem, the Article then calls for the design of a new systematic 
approach, resembling to a limited extent that of the Dodd-Frank Act, to understand 
which entities qualify as Critical Service Providers and why they should have en-
hanced risk management procedures. The Article proposes certain criteria to ground 
such an approach. Finally, the Article suggests that the companies designated as 
Critical Service Providers should be subject to some type of supervisory scrutiny, 
which would be the product of a collaborative private-public initiative and result in 
better risk management and internalizing. 
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INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on the importance of key digital service providers to the 
American economy and society. The precedence for identifying certain goods or en-
tities as “critical” to the United States first arose in the 1920s when dependence on 
foreign imports of certain materials was determined to be a vulnerability for the mil-
itary. And while throughout the years more and more goods and entities were viewed 
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as potential American vulnerabilities that must be protected, only in recent years has 
the significance of data management and cybersecurity in this context become no-
ticeable. This is largely because cyberattacks on leading institutions, governments, 
and private-sector businesses have become a frequent and constant growing threat. 
Consequently, the connection between security breaches and cyberattacks on key in-
stitutions and the likelihood of a catastrophic ripple effect on our technological, eco-
nomic, and social development has become more real than ever. This is especially 
true given how relatively effortless it is to launch a broad-scale cyberattack, as was 
demonstrated on May 12, 2017, when attackers took advantage of Microsoft software 
vulnerabilities and disrupted operations in more than 150 countries.1  
But May 12, 2017, is just one recent example. This connection has been demon-
strated frequently over the last few years in various industries identified as critical 
infrastructure.2 Nevertheless, information about the cyberattacks that impact 
American critical infrastructure, such as the number, type, and severity,3 remains 
limited and unsophisticated. Covering both cyber-related and general threats, some 
laws have been put in place to protect critical infrastructure and its operators. This 
started with Congress’s use of the term in Public Law 101-189, which defined “crit-
ical technologies” as “essential for the United States to develop to further the long-
term national security or economic prosperity of the United States.”4 But existing 
                                                                                                                
1. “We already face a global threat from electronic warfare systems capable of jamming 
satellite communications systems and global navigation space systems.” Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, 115th Cong. 10 (2016) (statement of James R. Clapper, former Director of 
National Intelligence), http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/wwt2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WJW9-69GB]; see also Dustin Volz & Eric Auchard, More Disruptions 
Feared from Cyber Attack; Microsoft Slams Government Secrecy, REUTERS (May 12, 2017, 
10:38 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-security-hospitals-idUSKBN18820S 
[https://perma.cc/E2TN-AWVE] (describing how a “worm dubbed WannaCry—‘ransom-
ware’ that [instantly] locked up more than 200,000 computers in more than 150 countries”—
disrupted operations at car factories, hospitals, shops, and schools as it took advantage of 
Microsoft software vulnerabilities). Among the victims were Britain’s National Health Service 
resulting in dozens of hospitals canceling their operations, FedEx in the United States, one of 
Germany’s largest train operators, Russian banks, and more. Volz & Auchard, supra note 1. 
The “attack lost momentum . . . after a security researcher took control of a server connected 
to the outbreak, which crippled a feature that caused the malware to rapidly spread across 
infected networks.” Id. “California-based cyber risk modeling firm Cyence [estimated] the 
total economic damage at $4 billion,” and according to Microsoft’s President Brad Smith, 
“governments around the world should ‘treat this attack as a wake-up call’ and ‘consider the 
damage to civilians that comes from hoarding these vulnerabilities and the use of these ex-
ploits.’” Id. 
2. For example, in recent years, hundreds of systems within the U.S. Department of 
Commerce were forced to disconnect from the internet due to cyberattacks. See Gregg Keizer, 
Chinese Hackers Hit Commerce Department, INFO. WK. (Oct. 6, 2006, 2:03 PM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/chinese-hackers-hit-commerce-department/d/did/1047684 
[https://perma.cc/W6U7-MUSS]. 
3. Scott J. Shackelford & Zachery Bohm, Securing North American Critical 
Infrastructure: A Comparative Case Study in Cybersecurity Regulation, 40 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 61, 
63 (2016). 
4. OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, NAT’L CRITICAL TECHS. REVIEW GRP., NATIONAL 
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U.S. regulations that attempt to identify and improve the stability of entities defined 
as critical, technology-based or not, including, since January 2017, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) designation of the election systems as 
critical infrastructure in the wake of increasing cyberattacks, do not cover all im-
portant service providers.5 The regulations do not cover, for example, digital service 
providers. 
Similar but unrelated to attempts to protect critical infrastructures, regulations 
have been proposed following the 2008 financial crisis to address the threat of po-
tentially critical, major private-sector entities collapsing to the detriment of the mar-
kets, the economy, and all of society.6 In particular, widespread public objection to 
the possibility of too-big-to-fail scenarios with societally harmful externalities led to 
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“the Dodd-Frank Act”).7 This act, which has been widely criticized for its ineffec-
tiveness, focused on risk management at financial institutions and attempted to re-
flect the administrations’ promise that, in the future, consumers would no longer be 
required to financially assist in solving private-sector, corporate behemoths’ failures 
and malfunctionings.8 Nevertheless, many commentators still argue that the failure 
of financial too-big-to-fail entities is unavoidable, that better risk management pro-
cedures are needed, and that the Dodd-Frank Act fails to offer a real solution to this 
problem.9
                                                                                                                
CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT 163 (1995).  
5. See Natalie Olivo, DHS Says Election System Is ‘Critical Infrastructure,’ LAW360 (Jan. 
9, 2017, 3:38 PM), https://www.law360.com/privacy/articles/878619/dhs-says-election-system-
is-critical-infrastructure-?nl_pk=5bceaabe-4b16-48ab-9db2-23250e5753d9&utm_source= 
newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=privacy [https://perma.cc/M3TR-NTBD] 
(“According to Johnson’s statement, this designation will place the infrastructure that makes 
up U.S. election systems—including polling places and voting machines—in the company of 
other critical infrastructure sectors that receive prioritized DHS cybersecurity attention. . . . 
‘Now more than ever, it is important that we offer our assistance to state and local election 
officials in the cybersecurity of their systems . . . . Election infrastructure is vital to our national 
interests, and cyberattacks on this country are becoming more sophisticated, and bad cyber 
actors—ranging from nation states, cybercriminals and hacktivists—are becoming more so-
phisticated and dangerous.’ Johnson stressed that the critical infrastructure determination 
‘does not mean a federal takeover’ concerning U.S. elections. Rather, he said, it allows DHS 
to prioritize cybersecurity assistance to state and local election officials.”); Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,739 (Feb. 12, 
2013) (defining critical infrastructure); see also What Is Critical Infrastructure?, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure 
[https://perma.cc/P7VG-TP5V]; Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 
2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 92, at 10–11 (Feb. 12, 2013) [hereinafter PPD-21]. 
6. See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin, Supersize Them? Large Banks, Taxpayers and 
the Subsidies that Lay Between, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 229 (2015). 
7. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of Title XII 
of the United States Code).
8. See, e.g., Annalyn Censky, Obama on New Law: ‘No More Taxpayer Bailouts,’ CNN 
(July 21, 2010, 12:46 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/21/news/economy/obama_signs_ 
wall_street_reform_bill [https://perma.cc/6TVT-5AGW]. 
9. See, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case Against the Dodd-Frank Act’s Living 
Wills: Contingency Planning Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29
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Most commentators thus far have focused solely on the failure or malfunctioning 
associated with financial institutions in discussions of critical  private-sector entities. 
This is partly because the 2008 crisis was the product of precisely this failure; crises 
are often followed by “bubble law”—misguided populist reactions that produce 
“quack” regulation with little empirical support. This reactionary legislation ad-
dresses the pitfalls of past crises rather than predicting new disastrous events, which 
are hypothetical, unimaginable, and sometimes referred to as “black swans.”10
Financial institutions are central to these regulatory attempts because they provide 
monetary services and credit. Indeed, their interconnectedness and reliance on gov-
ernment backing make them unique and more important to maintain than most enti-
ties, public or private. But while it is difficult to identify the potentially critical types 
of institutions to our economy and society before crises start, it is clear that other 
major entities, including nonfinancial ones such as technology companies, also pro-
vide key services to our society and economy. As Charles Perrow argues in his 
Normal Accidents, technology fails because systems complexity makes failure inev-
itable.11 In particular, in the twenty-first century, social and economic stability has 
drastically depended on supporting secure ongoing organizational services, efficient 
and safe information management systems, and secure data based on networked dig-
ital technologies.  
Size alone may not determine whether an entity is critical. For instance, politicians 
are less likely to receive much public interest or even support for preserving a gigan-
tic business entity selling clothing brands with a vast consolidated assets portfolio, 
although technically such an organization’s failure may inflict substantial risk to so-
cial stability beyond the financial sector. Other private-sector entities provide prod-
ucts and services on which we depend—they are fundamental to our lives today and 
deeply influence us. This Article argues that these entities include key digital service 
providers such as Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and possibly Microsoft, and 
                                                                                                                
(2012); Shahien Nasiripour, No, Obama Didn’t Kill Too Big To Fail, HUFFPOST (Apr. 13, 
2016, 8:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/obama-too-big-to-fail_us_570ec 
890e4b0ffa5937e242e [https://perma.cc/AGP6-TSJR]. 
10. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY 
IMPROBABLE 274–85 (2d ed. 2010); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal 
Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2011); James Fanto, 
Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Management in Finance and Environmental 
Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 735–36 (2009); Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: 
Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 195–96 (2009); Larry E. Ribstein, 
Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2003); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).  
11. Charles Perrow, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES
(1999). “Secretary Geithner told SIGTARP that he believed creating effective, purely objec-
tive criteria for evaluating systemic risk is not possible: ‘What size and mix of business do you 
classify as systemic? . . . It depends too much on the state of the world at the time. You won’t 
be able to make a judgment about what’s systemic and what’s not until you know the nature 
of the shock’ the economy is undergoing.” Does the Dodd-Frank Act End “Too Big To Fail?”: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 112th Cong. 92 (2011) (statement of Christy Romero, Acting Special Inspector 
General, Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(SIGTARP)).
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that they should be defined as “Critical Service Providers,” because they provide 
vital and strategic functions and services to our society and economy. As such, a 
failure or disastrous malfunctioning of their services or products, not to mention their 
own potential failure, which is not only limited to a bankruptcy scenario, is likely to 
impose an immediate crisis of confidence as well as negative externalities on the 
general public. 
This Article argues for this definition of Critical Service Providers not just be-
cause of the size and volume of these entities in the financial markets (equal to those 
of a midsize Western economy), but mainly because their power and importance 
stretch far beyond their mere scope. These entities have become extremely political 
as they reach levels of influence and impact that modern economies have never per-
mitted even the largest financial institutions to reach12 and redefine the very notions 
of politics and governance.13 A recent example of this, was described in the 
November 2018 New York Times’ exposé, which uncovered Facebook’s attempts to 
dissemble its influence during the 2016 elections. Among those attempts was the use 
of a Republican-affiliated opposition research firm to retaliate against and discredit 
Facebook’s critics, while disseminating negative stories about its competitors, in 
scope and scale that have never been seen before.14  
Moreover, vertical and horizontal integration by these businesses is broader than 
ever and encompasses scientific innovations, media, computing, telecommunication, 
retail, and even financial services, over which the key digital service providers now 
compete with traditional financial service providers.15 Additionally, leadership by 
                                                                                                                
12. See Jeremy Ghez, Why U.S. Tech Giants Might Not Dominate the World After All,
FORBES (Nov. 16, 2016, 11:37 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hecparis/2016/11/16/why-
us-tech-giants-might-not-dominate-the-world-after-all [https://perma.cc/VCZ6-E45H]. 
Similarly, in a series of papers from the last two years, Professor Maurice E. Stucke and 
Professor Ariel Ezrachi argue that, in the world of big data and artificial intelligence, network 
effects can fundamentally and forever change the way competition works in the digital econ-
omy and create barriers to entry, enabling big platforms to engage in behaviors such as collu-
sion, tacit collusion, and price discrimination, to the detriment of consumers. In their scholar-
ship, they discuss the changing dynamics of what they call the “digitized hand” and explain 
how the market in the ear of the digital economy may in fact appear to be more competitive 
than it really is. See, e.g., ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE 
PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (2016). 
13. See, e.g., Robert Epstein, How Google Could Rig the 2016 Election, POLITICO MAG. 
(Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/how-google-could-rig-
the-2016-election-121548 [https://perma.cc/DU2N-66W9]; Seth Fiegerman, Facebook Is 
Well Aware that It Can Influence Elections, CNN (Nov. 17, 2016, 11:33 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/17/technology/facebook-election-influence [https://perma.cc 
/2RWR-4D7G]; Issie Lapowsky, Here’s How Facebook Actually Won Trump the Presidency,
WIRED (Nov. 15, 2016, 1:12 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/facebook-won-trump-
election-not-just-fake-news [https://perma.cc/T96Z-6ZQ8].
14. Sheera Frenkel, Nicholas Confessore, Cecilia Kang, Matthew Rosenberg & Jack 
Nicas, Delay, Deny and Deflect: How Facebook’s Leaders Fought Through Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/technology/facebook-data-
russia-election-racism.html [https://perma.cc/5BLT-CQSV]. 
15. See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Big Data and Social 
Netbanks: Are You Ready to Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1211 (2016). 
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key digital service providers in cloud services—software used by all major industries 
and even government agencies—is noteworthy16 and may have alarming conse-
quences in the context of cybersecurity, especially as dependence on cloud services 
continues to rise. Finally, overall impact by key digital service providers on our 
cyber-social systems is unmatched and only recently have scholars begun to examine 
it.17  
Despite the above, and the massive externalities on the general public that poten-
tial failures associated with key digital service providers would impose, these enti-
ties’ safety and stability are not yet a top regulatory priority. One explanation for this 
could be that some believe that digital service providers are technology companies, 
and as such it is only natural for them to come and go as part of the commonplace
evolution of innovation, with the market forces correcting for unforeseen harms. But, 
as argued in this Article, while this might have been a convincing narrative in the 
past, when issues with technology companies mainly centered around anticompeti-
tive behavior, this is no longer the case with the key digital service providers. Indeed, 
today’s tech giants simply acquire and absorb any potential future competitors. These 
purchases also result in a chilling effect on funding of small startups, given the tech 
giants’ potential ability to out-man, out-fund, and immediately compete with any 
new innovative players.18 Likewise, while the failures or malfunctionings of key 
technology companies and their products might seem severe than that of key finan-
cial institutions, which are interconnected and rely on government backing, this 
                                                                                                                
16. See Chris Neiger, Too Big To Fail: Amazon Takes Aim at the Financial Services 
Cloud, MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 27, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016 
/02/27/too-big-to-fail-amazon-takes-aim-at-the-financial.aspx [https://perma.cc/AES9-7QUY]. 
17. For more on this point, see Stanford’s new 2015 Cyber Initiative, which researches 
cyber-social systems and their impact on society. “Cyber-social systems” refers to “cyber tech-
nologies [that] interact with existing social systems.” Introduction to the Concept of Cyber-
Social Systems, STAN. CYBER INITIATIVE, https://cyber.stanford.edu/research-and-
publications/introduction-concept-cyber-social-systems [https://perma.cc/592A-FLFG]. 
Social systems comprise the various organizations of human activity, including 
transportation, markets, political arenas, and other communities. Cyber technol-
ogies encompass networked digital technologies—notably, the internet—and ex-
tend, for instance, to infrastructure control systems and wireless biomedical de-
vices. Thus, cyber-social systems, both large and small, use embedded digital 
structures and devices to facilitate, enhance and scale human endeavors. 
Id.
18. Professor Tim Wu describes it in the following way: “No one’s willing to fund [profound 
innovation] because you’re not going to displace Facebook or Google. So we go around the edges 
somewhere and try and find some cute little thing that doesn’t bother anybody too much and get 
bought out. And so the movement to break away from the consumer welfare standard is growing. 
Sometimes called the New Brandeis movement, the idea is that the law should prioritize compe-
tition. It’s the same sort of standard EU regulators have been using to crack down on big tech 
companies; these standards were originally based on the American approach under Brandeis and 
Roosevelt.” Nilay Patel, It’s Time To Break Up Facebook, VERGE (Sept. 4, 2018, 1:00 PM) (al-
teration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://www.theverge.com/2018 
/9/4/17816572/tim-wu-facebook-regulation-interview-curse-of-bigness-antitrust [https://perma 
.cc/BB5Z-L9W9]. 
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Article argues that there are also major concerns involved in failures related to key 
digital service providers.  
Accordingly, the regulatory vacuum concerning key digital service providers is 
disturbing and should be addressed in a different legal framework as it is beyond the 
scope of this Article—as should these entities’ liability and protection requirements 
against cyberattacks, given the dire potential risks and consequences for society. As 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Leon Panetta stated in his secretary of 
defense confirmation testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “[t]he 
next Pearl Harbor that we confront could very well be a cyberattack that cripples 
America’s electrical grid and its security and financial systems.”19 Since cybertech-
nologies encompass networked digital technologies that extend, for example, to in-
frastructure control systems, the potential risks associated with and horrific possible 
consequences of the failure of a key digital service provider have led some jurisdic-
tions to regulate the risk management procedures of key digital service providers in 
the context of cybersecurity.20 This is because cyberattacks can directly impact the 
stability of such entities. In recent years, even the largest, most sophisticated global 
institutions, including technology and media entities, such as Microsoft and Yahoo, 
have fundamentally failed to keep up with hackers who can cause detrimental 
breaches21 relatively effortlessly and remotely.22 Cybersecurity is a complex and 
multifaceted challenge that is constantly on the rise in its importance and impacts 
                                                                                                                
19. For Leon Panetta’s statement, see Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack the Next 
Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 233 (2016), http://ncjolt.org/wp-content/uploads/2016 
/12/Trautman_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY2Y-DYRQ]. On August 8, 2016, the European 
Union’s NIS Directive began to be enforced after it had been approved by the European 
Parliament on July 6, 2016. It includes key digital service providers in the list of regulated 
critical infrastructure entities. See Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 6 July 2016 Concerning Measures for a High Common Level of Security of 
Network and Information Systems Across the Union, 2016 O.J. (L 194) 1, http://eur-lex 
.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2016:194:FULL [https://perma.cc/YS36-63G4]. 
20. Trautman, supra note 19. 
21. While the means of cyberattacks vary, the pattern of targets has been relatively con-
sistent and mainly include large databases and point-of-sale systems, such as those of govern-
ment agencies and political organizations (e.g., the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Democratic National Committee, the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency); infrastructure operators; 
major banking institutions; technology companies (e.g., Oracle, Dropbox, Apple, and Yahoo); 
voting records; network management companies; and online social networks. See, e.g.,
Damian Paletta, Personnel Data Breach a ‘Huge Deal,’ WALL ST. J., July 9, 2015, at A3 (re-
porting on the attack on the Office of Personnel Management); Riley Walters, Cyber Attacks 
on U.S. Companies in 2016, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 2, 2016), http:// 
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/12/cyber-attacks-on-us-companies-in-2016 [https:// 
perma.cc/4MTU-3QQH]. 
22. For example, according to Verizon’s 2016 data breach investigations report, “it took 
hackers minutes or less to compromise systems in ninety-three percent of the 2,260 breaches 
that Verizon analyzed, and the infiltrators were able to extract the data from the system within 
days in more than ninety-eight percent of the incidents.” Allison Grande, Data Breach Report 
Calls for Race To Catch Up with Hackers, LAW360 (Apr. 26, 2016, 11:44 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/789110/data-breach-report-calls-for-race-to-catch-up-with-
hackers [https://perma.cc/9N9D-J84U]. 
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more than financial institutions and government agencies, which are often mentioned 
in the media in that context.23 Furthermore, cybersecurity is proving to be a cross-
industry issue, although it appears that the financial sector players are currently ahead 
of all industries with their development of fraud and cybercrime prevention technol-
ogy and operations.24 This methodology will demand new proficiencies, including 
those that will fill gaps in the technology marketplace in an attempt to solve current 
information system challenges and to proactively use analytics when deciding real-
time, risk-based issues.25 The rise of the information society has created many op-
portunities for business entities to improve services to customers via new means and 
platforms. These means and platforms are more operationally efficient in terms of 
time and money. Moreover, this efficiency is rising while internet search is changing 
with digital personal assistants on the rise, and individuals that are distancing them-
selves from the junctions of decision making, putting their trust in the super plat-
forms, enabling them more and more control of the interface.26  
At the same time, hackers, criminals, and cyberterrorists are discovering new 
methods to take advantage of limitations and constantly strive to improve and update 
their attack schemes. Attackers keep searching for the weakest links in the infor-
mation supply chain and often attempt to hack or harm entities and institutions by 
indirectly attacking related third parties or backdoor channels even when the organ-
izations they are after have secure systems.27 Third-party providers and websites are 
exposed to, maintain, and even carry large amounts of data about consumers, making 
them targets as well.28  
                                                                                                                
23. For an analysis of “cybersecurity,” as “a concept that arrived on the post-Cold War 
agenda in response to a mixture of technological innovations and changing geopolitical con-
ditions,” see Lene Hansen & Helen Nissenbaum, Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the 
Copenhagen School, 53 INT’L STUD. Q., 1155, 1155–75 (2009). For more on banking and 
cybersecurity, see SAS INST. INC., CYBERRISK IN BANKING: A REVIEW OF THE KEY INDUSTRY 
THREATS AND RESPONSES AHEAD (2013), http://www.kroll.com/media/pdf/white-
papers/cyberrisk-in-banking-106605.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5XM-8U95]. The Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030, originally only covered financial institutions 
and government computers, but “Congress has continuously broadened the scope and cover-
age of the CFAA through subsequent amendments in 1994, 1996, 2001, 2002, and 2008” in-
cluding all computers in interstate (or international) commerce/communication. That history 
of the CFAA exactly demonstrates that far more people should care about cybersecurity. See
CFAA Background, NACDL, https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=34244 
[https://perma.cc/UM7B-N79V].
24. SAS INST. INC., supra note 23. 
25. Id. 
26. NAVIGATING THE DIGITAL AGE: THE DEFINITIVE CYBERSECURITY GUIDE FOR 
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 207–19 (2015), https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/Navigating_The 
_Digital_Age.pdf [https://perma.cc/KE5W-UWCQ]. 
27. Id.
28. SAS INST. INC., supra note 23. Similarly, discussing the potential dangers associated 
with third party websites, and single sign-offs, a recent University of Illinois research paper 
found that hackers hacking into the tech giants can not only take over the accounts of the tech 
giants’ users but also access third-party websites those users logged into with the tech giants, 
such as Facebook, Google, etc. The paper argues that once hackers accessed users’ accounts 
they can then access “everything from people’s private messages on Tinder to their passport 
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Battling this trend comes with a high price tag. Not only are the costs of crisis 
prevention and protection significant, but the cost to society as a whole of these at-
tacks is on the rise, and the lack of global collaboration enables this trend to grow. 
This Article focuses on these issues from the perspective of key digital service pro-
viders, which have been somewhat overlooked in the United States in the context of 
a potential cyber-driven failure or malfunction and its conceivable, shocking conse-
quences on the economy and society.  
Advocating for the creation of a definition for Critical Service Providers, and the 
importance of enhancing such entities’ risk management, this Article starts by ex-
plaining why the Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0 issue has not yet become a priority. First, dig-
ital service providers are technology companies, which many believe come and go 
with the market forces correcting for unforeseen harms that do not include negative 
ripple effects on the economy or society. Second, technology giants are not as care-
fully regulated as banks because, unlike banks, they do not take insured deposits 
backed by the government. Third, even financial institutions, which are heavily reg-
ulated, were not required, until recently, to focus on cybersecurity. Finally, some 
believe that there is no point in worrying about Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0, considering 
how difficult it is to prepare for theoretical unknowns. Nevertheless, the Article ar-
gues that after considering the issues outlined in the Critical Service Provider list of 
factors, such as size, businesses’ vertical and horizontal integration, and impact on 
technology, economy, and cyber-social systems, Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0 appears to be 
a valid concern. 
Recognizing this problem, the Article then calls for the design of a new systematic 
approach, partially inspired by recent EU regulation and resembling some of the fea-
tures of the Dodd-Frank Act, to determine the entities that qualify as Critical Service 
Providers and who will categorize them as such. The Article proposes certain criteria 
to ground such an approach and addresses the undesired incentives that come into 
play when Critical Service Providers understand their importance and impact. 
Finally, the Article suggests that the companies designated as Critical Service 
Providers should be subject to some type of a supervisory scrutiny and regulation, 
which would preferably be the product of a collaborative private-public initiative.  
The Article unfolds as follows: Part I briefly introduces the too-big-to-fail concept 
from its inception and the strategies used to address it to the entities that have been 
considered critical within its framework, focusing on the United States and the finan-
cial sector. Part II examines the connection between Critical Infrastructure Providers 
and Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0. Part III zooms in on key digital service providers, arguing 
that they should be viewed as Critical Service Providers. Part IV describes the 
challenges posed by cybersecurity in free economies, including some recent 
examples of breaches in the international technology sector, and examines how those 
challenges specifically affect the biggest global and omnipotent key digital service 
providers. It also discusses the potential consequences of such massive and lethal 
                                                                                                                
information on Expedia, all without leaving a trace. Even more staggering: You could be at 
risk even if you've never used Facebook to log into a third-party site.” Mohammad 
Ghasemisharif, Amruta Ramesh, Stephen Checkoway, Chris Kanich & Jason Polakis, O
Single Sign-Off, Where Art Thou? An Empirical Analysis of Single Sign-On Account Hijacking  
and Session Management on the Web, August 15–17, 2018 https://www.cs.uic.edu 
/~polakis/papers/sso-usenix18.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3E2-2WHW]. 
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cyberattacks and a possible too-big-to-fail scenario, while analyzing the issue of 
expectations within public choice theory. Part V surveys current regulations that 
could be relevant to cyberattacks, including those designed to address issues other 
than the failures of corporate giants or financial institutions. It also calls for a new 
systematic approach to determining who will designate Critical Service Providers, 
especially when changed circumstances might require this label to be applied to new, 
currently unimaginable entities, based on the Article’s outlined criteria. A conclusion 
advocating for some scrutiny and regulation of Critical Service Providers follows.  
I. TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL—THE FINANCIAL STORY
A. From 1984 Until the 2008 Crisis 
In order to understand why key digital service providers should be associated with 
the concept of Too-Big-To-Fail, it is imperative to fully understand the concept itself. 
The term “Too-Big-To-Fail” was first coined in 1984, concerning the federal bank’s 
intervention to prevent Continental Illinois National Bank from failing.29 In the dec-
ades that followed, the public and the media gave some attention to the term.30 During 
the financial crisis of 2008, the concept resurfaced once again: regulators announced 
that the U.S. government would provide capital to the top nineteen bank holding 
companies, if “stress tests” revealed that they could not raise it on their own.31 The 
government ended up infusing more than $220 billion of capital into eighteen of 
those financial institutions, thus indicating that they were presumptively too-big-to-
fail.32 This happened after advocates from both sides of the political aisle agreed that 
these institutions must be saved, arguing that their failure would shake the economy 
and negatively impact society as a whole.33
The 2008 economic crisis and the bailouts that resulted from it were the products 
of a flawed and fragmented regulatory system operating with outdated notions of 
                                                                                                                
29. See DAVID S. HOLLAND, WHEN REGULATION WAS TOO SUCCESSFUL—THE SIXTH 
DECADE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF THE TROUBLES OF THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY 
IN THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S, at 37–51 (1998). 
30. See, e.g., Benton E. Gup, Are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Too Big To Fail?, in
POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 285, 310 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004);
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to 
Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1726–27 (2006); 
Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 
YALE J. ON REG. 129, 146 (1986); Jeffrey E. Garten, Opinion, Too Big To Fail, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 26, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/26/opinion/too-big-to-fail.html [https:// 
perma.cc/7GZU-53Z5]. 
31. See Packin, supra note 9, at 33 n.11. 
32. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation To Address the Too-Big-To-
Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 713 (2010). 
33. See generally Packin, supra note 9. 
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systemic risk.34 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, rating agencies,35 regulators,36
global organizations,37 and academics38 made the argument that the largest financial 
institutions enjoy competitive advantages39 because the market perceives them as 
likely to be saved in future financial crises.40 This perception is also anchored in the 
                                                                                                                
34. Professor Steven Schwarcz defines systemic risk as “the risk that (i) an economic 
shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) 
the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial 
institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often 
evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk,
97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).  
35. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, BANKS: RATING METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 11
(2011), http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/BanksRatingMethodology_Final110911 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU7W-N6RP].  
36. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said that new regulations aim to end 
the need for subsidies. See Christopher Ryan, Elizabeth Warren: Too-Big-To-Fail Banks Get 
$83bn/year Subsidy. Why?, AM. BLOG (Feb. 28, 2013, 12:41 PM), http://americablog.com 
/2013/02/elizabeth-warren-83bn-bank-subsidy.html [https://perma.cc/45ZZ-7V77]. 
37. See, e.g., Gara Afonso, João A. C. Santos & James Traina, Do “Too-Big-To-Fail” 
Banks Take on More Risk?, 20 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 41, 42 (2014),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2014/1412afon.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/G94H-3B3W] (finding that the biggest banks rely on the government to save them); 
Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 
WP/12/128, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12128.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/2MQS-998P]. 
38. “The largest financial institutions . . . are able to borrow money much more cheaply 
than other financial institutions, because their cost of credit is artificially reduced by the Too 
Big to Fail subsidy.” Who Is Too Big To Fail: Does Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act Enshrine 
Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of 
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 4 (2013), http://financialservices.house.gov 
/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba09-wstate-dskeel-20130515.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UFS-YRUS] 
(written testimony of David A. Skeel, Jr., Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School);
see also Bryan Kelly, Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Too-Systemic-To-Fail: What 
Option Markets Imply About Sector-Wide Government Guarantees, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 1278 
(2016) (supporting the idea that there is a too-big-to-fail subsidy). 
39. Such competitive advantages include Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizing the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to create a bridge institution that can be kept 
in place for up to five years, during which institutions receive tax-free status. See 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 5390(h)(10) (West 2014). This advantage is clearly an indication that Title II does impose 
costs on taxpayers.  
40. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleidere,
Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank 
Equity Is Not Socially Expensive 1–7 (Stanford Univ. Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, 
Working Paper No. 161, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2349739 [https://perma.cc/3AE4-
MFSC]; Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph Warburton, The End of Market 
Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees 3–4, 13 (May 1, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656 [https://perma.cc/45DQ-ST5H] 
(arguing that big banks borrow funds at lower costs from private lenders because the implicit 
guarantees reduce the amount of big banks’ credit risk in comparison to smaller banks). 
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Dodd-Frank Act’s regulation of systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs),41 as described below. 
The catchy term too-big-to-fail is usually mentioned in the context of SIFIs, but 
it is not just banks’ failure that this regulatory principle governs. Historically, differ-
ent types of important service providers have been viewed as too important to fail.42
Three notable examples include the 1930s railroads operation because of their critical 
infrastructure functions and role in the overall economy,43 California’s multibillion-
dollar bailout of Pacific Gas & Electric Company approved by a federal court,44 and 
the post-9/11 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, which the U.S. 
Congress passed to provide the airline industry with financial aid.45 In these cases, 
the externalities of potential failure of these nonfinancial institutions would have 
taken too great a toll on society.  
But beyond consumers’ financial support for critical entities, in 2008, the too-big-
to-fail issue altered the entities’ behavioral incentives and ethical standards. In the 
years since the financial crisis, one of the perverse effects of the too-big-to-fail prob-
lem has been revealed: the government’s inconsistent or lax disciplinary approach 
towards important financial institutions that fail to comply with the law.46 This policy 
was nicknamed “too-big-to-jail”; as then-attorney general Eric Holder explained it, 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) could not indict systemic institutions out of fear of 
the “collateral consequences” of economic harm.47 This policy, evident in 
                                                                                                                
41. Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, SIFIs are institutions that are so essential to the U.S. 
financial system that their failure would cause traumatic damage to the financial markets, as 
well as the entire economy. Nevertheless, it is not clear if all SIFIs must be defined as such,
or only those whom the FSOC believes are required to do so. Compare Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §113(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2012) (using 
the term “may”), with id. § 112(a)(2)(H), 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(H) (indicating a require-
ment).
42. See, e.g., Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Too Important To Fail: Bankruptcy Versus Bailout 
of Socially Important Non-Financial Institutions, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 159 (2017). 
43. Joseph R. Mason & Daniel A. Schiffman, Too Big To Fail, Government Bailouts, and 
Managerial Incentives: The Case of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to 
the Railroad Industry During the Great Depression, in TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 49, 49–54 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004). 
44. Judge Approves PG&E Bailout, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2003), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107214516968910000 [https://perma.cc/22CB-3VH7].
45. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 
230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)); see also Margaret M. Blair, The Economics 
of Post-September 11 Financial Aid to Airlines, 36 IND. L. REV. 367 (2003). 
46. See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin, Breaking Bad? Too-Big-To-Fail Banks Not 
Guilty as Not Charged, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 1089 (2014). 
47. Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Eric. H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United 
States), https://fas.org/irp/congress/2013_hr/hjc-doj.pdf [https://perma.cc/K35H-V6QF]; Who
Is Too Big To Fail: Are Large Financial Institutions Immune from Federal Prosecution?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
113th Cong. 6 (2013) (statement of Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal 
Division, Department of Justice). 
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JPMorgan’s $13 billion settlement in 2013 with the government for the bank’s re-
sponsibility in the 2008 crisis, has been criticized as undermining the rule of law.48
Despite the U.S. government’s insistence that it does not release anyone from poten-
tial prosecution, most settling entities have received deferred or nonprosecution 
agreements and eventually avoided indictment or convictions. Further evidence of 
this practice came in July 2016, when it was revealed that Britain’s chancellor, 
George Osborne, and the United Kingdom’s former financial watchdog, the 
Financial Services Authority, “obstructed” the 2012 U.S. investigation into HSBC’s 
money laundering and contributed to watering down the bank’s punishment.49
Allowing important institutions to escape legal liability has created a major prob-
lem—the public perception of bias in the legal system and favorable prosecutorial 
treatment of institutions with large numbers of employees and shareholders and great 
economic impact,50 and indictments for the economically weak but not for the eco-
nomically powerful.51 Accordingly, given that the too-big-to-jail policy incentivizes 
unethical behavior, it can be argued that it encourages unwelcome business practices 
and maybe even criminality.52 Certainly, a simple cost-benefit analysis shows that 
fines for an illegally obtained profit can be paid off by committing more illegal ac-
tivities in the future, for which the fined entities and their executives are unlikely to 
be held accountable.  
The too-big-to-jail issue is not unique to the financial sector.53 Several years after 
the financial crisis, these public perceptions of bias began to crop up in the media 
again, this time in connection with key digital service providers. The public was re-
sponding to several reports of potential corporate malfeasance, including a Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) probe of Google’s business practices that produced no ev-
idence of wrongdoing, despite media reports that the FTC had accidentally disclosed 
                                                                                                                
48. See Wall Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate 
Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 127–29 (2010) (statement of James K. Galbraith, Lloyd 
M. Bentsen, Jr., Chair in Government/Business Relations, Lyndon B. Johnson School of 
Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin); Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The 
“Too Big To Jail” Effect and the Impact on the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging 
Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1322 (2014); Letter from Senator Jeffrey A. Merkley to Eric 
Holder, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.merkley.senate.gov/news 
/press-releases/merkley-blasts-too-big-to-jail-policy-for-lawbreaking-banks [https://perma.cc 
/4FPM-Q6KG].  
49. Rupert Neate, HSBC Escaped US Money-Laundering Charges After Osborne’s 
Intervention, GUARDIAN (July 11, 2016, 3:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business 
/2016/jul/11/hsbc-us-money-laundering-george-osborne-report [https://perma.cc/8RYJ-K454]. 
50. Sharon E. Foster, Too Big To Prosecute: Collateral Consequences, Systematic 
Institutions and the Rule of Law, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 655, 658 (2015). 
51. Id. 
52. See Oscar Williams-Grut, Too Big to Jail: George Osborne Helped HSBC Avoid US 
Criminal Charges For Money Laundering, BUS. INSIDER (July 12, 2016, 3:28 AM), 
http://uk.businessinsider.com/hsbc-too-big-to-jail-report-george-osborne-letter-warned-of-
financial-contagion-if-bank-prosecuted-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/BL7V-XQAE]. 
53. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE 
WITH CORPORATIONS (2014) (arguing that federal prosecutions have involved many different 
types of large public corporations, including Google). 
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evidence of Google’s anticompetitive behavior. After enraged public reactions to and 
much media coverage of the story, FTC leaders allowed Google to make voluntary 
changes to its practices rather than face a lawsuit.54  
Governments can do much more for key private-sector institutions than avoid 
prosecutions when dealing with them. Government subsidies can impact business 
practices and increase or decrease productivity in order to advance social or eco-
nomic interests and avoid major economic harms. Unfortunately, subsidies both cre-
ate and eliminate undesired incentives, which result in unintended consequences.55
For instance, the government’s approach to the banking sector inadvertently encour-
aged institutions to (i) borrow much more, (ii) take excessive risks, and (iii) expand 
into various unrelated industries.56  
B. No More Too-Big-To-Fail? 
Public awareness of the government’s favorable treatment of too-big-to-fail enti-
ties has risen drastically in recent years. In particular, attention has spiked in the wake 
of the $11 trillion of assistance to financial institutions and more than $6 trillion in 
economic stimulus programs spent by the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the EU.57 Given the harsh economic and social consequences of the failure of a 
megainstitution, observers have argued that the best way to address the too-big-to-
fail problem is to break up such institutions.58 One of the commentators, Alan 
Greenspan, said that “[i]f they’re too big to fail, they’re too big.”59
                                                                                                                
54. See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying 
and Bundling?, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 365 (2015) (examining Google’s pattern and 
practice of leveraging its dominance in order to enter new markets, compel usage of its ser-
vices, and dominate competing offerings); Ryan Lynch, Why Google Felt Lucky at FTC,
FORBES (Mar. 31, 2015, 3:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2015/03 
/31/why-google-felt-lucky-at-ftc [https://perma.cc/8PEU-UABZ]; Rick Rule, FTC’s Pass on 
Google Opens the Door for the Justice Department, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 9, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/01/09/ftcs-pass-on-google-opens-the-door-for-
the-justice-department [https://perma.cc/UFJ9-EWDD]. The FTC also declined to take action 
in its response to Google Street View, even as multiple state attorneys general and foreign 
regulators cracked down on the same Google practices. See Investigation of Google Street 
View, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/streetview [https://perma 
.cc/KS2A-QLYL]. 
55. For examples of such unintended consequences in different industries, see Packin, 
supra note 6. 
56. Id.
57. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., TBTF SUBSIDY FOR LARGE BANKS—LITERATURE 
REVIEW (2013), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/litreview.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/5ZZ8-WM27]. 
58. Commentators agree that “catastrophic risks are difficult to identify and their conse-
quences in the complex financial institutions are almost impossible to predict.” James A. 
Fanto, Financial Regulation Reform: Maintaining the Status Quo, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 635, 
653 (2010). 
59. Greenspan Calls to Break Up Banks ‘Too Big To Fail,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2009, 
3:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/greenspan-break-up-banks-too-big-to-
fail/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/HQ4M-G69S]. 
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Attempting to address the problems that caused the financial crisis and resolve the 
too-big-to-fail problem, lawmakers have sought significant regulatory reform. The 
Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010; inter alia, it authorizes regu-
lators to take certain actions to reduce both the likelihood that a large financial com-
pany will fail and the impact of any such failure. It also turns the Federal Reserve 
into a “super regulator” for a number of financial conglomerates, including previ-
ously unregulated financial entities,60 creates new regulatory agencies such as the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to monitor financial institutions,61 and 
tasks multiple agencies with supervising different parts of the financial system.62
Finally, as President Obama declared upon its enactment, the Dodd-Frank Act at-
tempts to solve the too-big-to-fail problem and avoid foisting its costs onto society.63
This was meant to ensure that the U.S. government would never again provide funds  
                                                                                                                
60. Together, these financial entities are referred to as the “shadow banking system.” For 
more on the shadow banking system, see Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the 
Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY (2010), https:// 
www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/regulating-the-shadow-banking-system-with-comments-
and-discussion [https://perma.cc/UC2S-THC2] (arguing that although the shadow banking 
system greatly contributed to the recent financial crisis, it remains relatively unregulated even 
after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
61. Pursuant to section 111 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321 (West 2014), the 
FDIC Board of Directors approved a joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) on March 
29, 2011, for covered systemic organizations to file and report resolution plans and credit ex-
posure reports. 76 Fed. Reg. 22,648 (proposed Apr. 22, 2011) [hereinafter FDIC’s NPR]. On 
September 13, 2011, the FDIC Board of Directors approved a final rule to be issued jointly by 
the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board to implement section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
12 U.S.C.A. § 5365(d), laying out what the largest and most complex financial firms must 
include in living wills. The final rule became effective November 30, 2011. See Resolution 
Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323 (Nov. 1, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 243, 381). 
62. For example, on September 13, 2011, the FDIC Board of Directors approved a com-
plementary Interim Final Rule under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to require insured 
depository institutions with $50 billion or more in total assets to submit periodic contingency 
plans to the FDIC for resolution in the event of the depository institution failure. See Special 
Reporting, Analysis and Contingent Resolution Plans at Certain Large Insured Depository 
Institutions, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,464 (proposed May 17, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
360); Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Board Approves Interim Final Rule Requiring Resolution 
Plans for Insured Depository Institutions Over $50 Billion (Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11150.html [https://perma.cc/GX89-SBQA]. 
63. See Regulating and Resolving Institutions Considered “Too Big To Fail:” Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of 
Gary H. Stern, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis), http:// 
www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/sterntestimony05-06-09.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/KV9D-H7KE]; Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout 
Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 991 (1992) (“The first justification for the presumption against bailout 
is that government intervention to protect private industry violates the free-market principles 
that generally govern our economy.”). 
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like the $1.525 trillion given through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)64
and the Stimulus Package,65 covered by taxpayer money,66 in addition to ongoing 
government-assisted financial support to too-big-to-fail financial institutions.67  
The Dodd-Frank Act also includes an enhanced supervisory scheme for SIFIs, 
pursuant to which the largest nonbank financial companies and bank holding com-
panies require special monitoring and supervisory schemes.68 To monitor, reduce, 
and ideally prevent risk, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that SIFIs prepare “break the 
glass” reorganization plans,69 commonly known as “living wills,”70 and submit them 
for review to the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), and the FSOC.71 These living wills, which are, in essence, hypothetical 
                                                                                                                
64. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3765 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012)). EESA helped establish the 
TARP, which enabled the Treasury to purchase or guarantee up to $700 billion in troubled 
assets that were owned by financial institutions. See id.  
65. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
66. See Joel Achenbach, A Sense of Resentment Amid the ‘For Sale’ Signs, WASH. POST
(Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/21/AR 
2008092102534.html [https://perma.cc/S3LY-TSBC]; Jonathan Weber, The Wall Street 
Bailout: What About Main Street?, NEWWEST (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.newwest.net 
/topic/article/what_does_the_wall_st_bailout_mean_for_you/C35/L35 [https://perma.cc 
/BC98-3BSD]. 
67. The U.S. Department of the Treasury website provides details on programs supplying 
continued capital to financial institutions. Financial Stability, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc 
/CBD8-9DTV]. 
68. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5365(d)(1) (West 2014). Indeed, pursuant to the Final Rule, the law 
“applies to any bank holding company that has $50 billion or more in total consolidated as-
sets.” Final Rule for Federal Reserve System and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 76 
Fed. Reg. 67,323, 67,326 (Nov. 1, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 243, 381); see also
12 C.F.R. § 381.2(f) (2017) (defining “covered company”).
69. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5365(d)(1). Pursuant to the FDIC’s NPR and the Final Rule, 
“[r]apid and orderly resolution” means “reorganization or liquidation of the covered company
. . . under the Bankruptcy Code.” 12 C.F.R. § 381.2(o) (2017). 
70. These plans are named after the “traditional” living wills—legal schemes that provide 
for a patient’s wishes concerning the use of specific life-sustaining treatments after the onset 
of that patient’s terminal disease or another catastrophic accident. See, e.g., Patrick Webster, 
Enforcement Problems Arising from Conflicting Views of Living Wills in the Legal, Medical 
and Patient Communities, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 793, 793 (2001). 
71. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5365(d)(3)–(5); Final Rule for Federal Reserve System and Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323. Accordingly, in July 2012, nine of the 
world’s biggest financial institutions submitted to the U.S. regulators and gave the public a 
peek at their living wills as requested. See Jessica Holzer, Banks’ “Living Wills” Unveiled,
WALL ST. J. (July 3, 2012; 4:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304 
211804577505011956447968 [https://perma.cc/R6MC-WMJZ].
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restructuring plans, mandate that each SIFI72 internally manage and better monitor 
its business risks and report periodically on noteworthy changes or risks.73  
II. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. Critical Infrastructure Operators  
While the Dodd-Frank Act focuses on regulating financial institutions, especially 
those that are systemically important, other nonfinancial institutions have also been 
found to be politically, economically, and socially critical. According to the USA 
PATRIOT Act,74 critical infrastructure operators provide the essential services that 
underpin our modern society and serve as the backbone of our economy, security, 
and health.75 In 1998, the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, set forth the roles, responsibilities, and objectives for pro-
tecting the nation’s utility, transportation, financial, and other essential infrastruc-
ture.76 It identified activities whose critical infrastructures should be protected: in-
formation and communications; banking and finance; water supply; aviation, 
highways, mass transit, pipelines, rail, and waterborne commerce; emergency and 
law enforcement services; emergency, fire, and continuity of government services; 
public health services; electric power, oil, and gas production; and storage. In addi-
tion, the PDD identified four activities in which the federal government controls crit-
ical infrastructure: (1) internal security and federal law enforcement, (2) foreign in-
telligence, (3) foreign affairs, and (4) national defense. 
 Similar to too-big-to-fail entities, critical infrastructure entities are so important 
that the government believes that their incapacitation or destruction would have a 
devastating effect on the country’s “security, national economic security, national 
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”77 Attempting to better 
protect our critical infrastructures, since 1998, the different administrations added 
authorities directing federal government efforts to protect and manage related risks, 
including Executive Order (EO) 13,636,78 and the Obama administration’s PPD-21
                                                                                                                
72. “FDIC officials said 124 banks would be subject to the rule, 26 of which are U.S. 
bank holding companies. The rest are subsidiaries of foreign-owned banks.” Victoria McGrane 
& Alan Zibel, FDIC Drafts Rule on “Living Wills” for Banks, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2011,
5:31 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704559904576230842703099
306.html [https://perma.cc/8YUX-KSZQ].
73. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5365(d)(2). 
74. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1). 
75. See id. § 1016(e); 42 U.S.C.A. § 5195c(e) (West 2014).
76. See Presidential Decision Directive 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector 
Coordinators, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,804 (May 22, 1998).
77. PPD-21, supra note 5. 
78. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13,636, supra note 5. 
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from February 12, 2013,79 which superseded other authorities issued during the 
George W. Bush administration. PPD-21 ordered an evaluation of the existing pub-
lic-private partnership model, the identification of baseline data and system require-
ments for efficient information exchange, and the development of a situational 
awareness capability. It also called for an update of the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan, and a new research and development plan for Critical Infrastructure, 
to be updated every four years.80 Finally, the Trump administration also issued an 
executive order in May 2017 instructing agencies to proactively assess cybersecurity 
risks and share threat information in order to better safeguard federal networks and 
infrastructure.81 Trumps’ EO brings the government closer to an approach long em-
braced by the private sector and ramps up liability risks for companies that have yet 
to embrace the practices. It followed the budget deal passed by congressional leaders 
on April 30, 2017, which boosted funding for cybersecurity and privacy initiatives at 
the DHS and the FTC, including the allocation of nearly $1 billion to help fortify 
public-sector networks against cyberattacks.82 This is especially helpful, as the 
DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Office of Infrastructure 
Protection (IP) leads the coordinated national effort to manage risks to the nation’s 
critical infrastructure and enhance the security and resilience of America’s physical 
and cyberinfrastructure.83  
                                                                                                                
79. PPD-21, supra note 5. 
80. RITA TEHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CYBERSECURITY: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
AUTHORITATIVE REPORTS AND RESOURCES (2016), reprinted in Congressional Research 
Service [CRS] Reports, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44410.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4TBL-FVN5]. 
81. See Exec. Order No.13,228 on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks 
and Critical Infrastructure, 82 Fed. Reg. 32,172 (May 11, 2017); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., President’s Executive Order Will Strengthen Cybersecurity for Federal 
Networks and Critical Infrastructure (May 11, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news 
/2017/05/11/president-s-executive-order-will-strengthen-cybersecurity-federal-networks-and 
[https://perma.cc/VCS2-7YPZ] (according to the EO, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework will 
be a guide for managing cybersecurity risks for government agencies and critical infrastructure 
businesses, and DHS must engage with owners and operators of the nation’s critical infra-
structure to identify how agencies can support cybersecurity efforts and report to the President 
within 180 days on findings and recommendations for better supporting critical infrastructure 
entities). 
82. Allison Grande, DHS, FTC Cybersecurity Efforts Get Lift with Spending Deal,
LAW360, (May 1, 2017, 8:03 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/919078/dhs-ftc-
cybersecurity-efforts-get-lift-with-spending-deal [https://perma.cc/X999-2J9N]. 
83. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION FACT SHEET
(2017), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/ip-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/B9Q4-P4R7]. 
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B. Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure  
Despite its various legal authorities, U.S. critical infrastructure entities are not 
well protected and are under constant attack.84 Sophisticated cyberattacks85 in partic-
ular have been on the rise in recent years.86 And while U.S. policy makers have long 
agreed that critical infrastructure sectors should be better protected against cyber 
risks, as all sectors rely to some extent on computers, networks, and automated sys-
tems,87 the regulators have yet to put clear legal cybersecurity principles in place, 
although other jurisdictions, including China and the EU have recently done so.88
                                                                                                                
84. Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1506 
(2013). 
85. Cybersecurity Threats Impacting the Nation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 3 
(2012) (statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director of Information Security Issues, 
Government Accountability Office); AMIT AGRAWAL & JACK LAWSON, U.S. EXECUTIVE 
ORDER 13636 AND CRITICAL SECURITY CAPABILITIES TO CONSIDER 3 (2014), http:// 
www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/critical-security-
capabilities-paper.pdf. 
86. Shane Tews & James Cunningham, The Road Ahead for Cybersecurity, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. (June 16, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.techpolicydaily.com/technology 
/road-ahead-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/D7BP-C434]. 
87. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RECOMMENDED PRACTICE: DEVELOPING AN 
INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS CYBERSECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE CAPABILITY iii (2009), 
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity 
_incident_response_100609.pdf [https://perma.cc/89WD-WDAD].
88. ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO 
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 2–3 (2013), reprinted 
in Congressional Research Service [CRS] Reports, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, https:// 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf [https://perma.cc/VMK5-WQ6U]; Lawrence J. 
Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 341, 377 
(2015); Chris Laughlin, Note, Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructure Sectors: A Proactive 
Approach To Ensure Inevitable Laws and Regulations Are Effective, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 346, 
354 (2016) (stating that “[f]rom 2009 through 2014, over 110 bills and resolutions were intro-
duced in Congress related to cybersecurity,” but each failed to pass, and even the legislation 
that passed in 2014 and 2015 “is insufficient either because it does not directly address critical 
infrastructure cybersecurity or because it does so inadequately for the changing cybersecurity 
landscape”); Karen Epper Hoffman, Following the Framework: Government Standards, SC
MAG. (June 2, 2014), https://www.scmagazine.com/following-the-framework-government-
standards/article/540122 [https://perma.cc/F9Z5-X7VX]. For a discussion on the EU, see be-
low. As for China, the Chinese legislature passed a new cybersecurity law in November 2016 
that went into effect on June 1, 2017, after public consultation on several previous drafts of 
the legislation. The cybersecurity law has a wide scope and contains provisions relating to 
both privacy and cybersecurity. Many of the law’s key provisions apply to two types of com-
panies: “network operators” and “critical information infrastructure” (CII) providers, which 
includes companies that provide services that, if lost or destroyed, would damage Chinese 
national security or the public interest. These broad definitions led to much criticism from 
American tech giants, such as Microsoft, Google, and Amazon, which view this law as an 
attempt to get their source code and an advantage over them, rather than a means to increase 
security. See Courtney M. Bowman, Ying Li & Lijuan Hou, A Primer on China’s New 
Cybersecurity Law: Privacy, Cross-Border Transfer Requirements, and Data Localization, 
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This is a serious failure on the part of legislators given that the scale of potential 
damage is high89 and attackers have already targeted critical infrastructure institu-
tions.90  
After Congress’s attempts to pass cybersecurity legislation failed, President 
Obama, as mentioned above, issued several directives and executive orders, attempt-
ing to enhance the currently insufficient patchwork of cybersecurity laws and regu-
lations governing U.S. national security.91 In early 2013, President Obama issued EO 
13,636,92 which included numerous provisions meant to improve the security and 
resiliency of critical infrastructure sectors, including a directive for the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop a cybersecurity framework 
to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure.93 Then, in early 2014, NIST released 
the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (“NIST 
Framework”),94 which provided a structure for the existing principles and stand-
ards.95 The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 201496 directed NIST to coordinate 
American agencies to work with other jurisdictions to create international cyberse-
curity principles.97 Additionally, in December 2015, Congress included the 
                                                                                                                
Privacy Law Blog, PROSKAUER LLP (May 9, 2017), http://privacylaw 
.proskauer.com/2017/05/articles/international/a-primer-on-chinas-new-cybersecurity-law-
privacy-cross-border-transfer-requirements-and-data-localization [https://perma.cc/PW5D-
F7RP]; China Adopts Cybersecurity Law Despite Foreign Opposition, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Nov. 7, 2016, 12:33 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-07/china-
passes-cybersecurity-law-despite-strong-foreign-opposition [https://perma.cc/YV6D-25UN]. 
89. Eric Engleman, The Telecom Industry’s Pushback Against Cybersecurity,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 7, 2013, 7:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-03-
07/the-telecom-industrys-pushback-against-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/XN4Z-7XWK];
Susan Joseph, A Cybersecurity Framework for the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure: How 
CableLabs Is Helping, CABLELABS (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.cablelabs.com/a-
cybersecurity-framework-for-the-nations-critical-infrastructure-how-cablelabs-is-helping 
[https://perma.cc/RGD8-AFNT]; see also MICHAEL HAYDEN, CURT HÉBERT & SUSAN 
TIERNEY, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CYBERSECURITY AND THE NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC 
GRID: NEW POLICY APPROACHES TO ADDRESS AN EVOLVING THREAT 9 (2014), 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/Cybersecurity%20Electric 
%20Grid%20BPC.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RJJ-RNLX]. 
90. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman, August Cole & Yochi Dreazen, Computer Spies Breach 
Fighter-Jet Project, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles 
/SB124027491029837401 [https://perma.cc/L6Y9-Y4AQ]. 
91. Mercedes K. Tunstall, The Path to Comprehensive Cybersecurity Laws in the United 
States, in UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSPACE LAW 61, 62 (2015 ed.). 
92. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13,636, supra note 5. 
93. Id. at 11,740–41. 
94. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents 
/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXH7-6AN8]. 
95. Id. at 13.
96. Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 (to be codified in scattered sections of Title XV 
of the United States Code).  
97. Jennifer Huergo, Interagency Report Advocates Support for International 
Cybersecurity Standardization, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://www.nist.gov/itl/201508_cyber 
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Cybersecurity Act of 2015, which permits organizations to voluntarily share infor-
mation about cyber risks and defensive measures with the government while guaran-
teeing them some protection from liability, in the omnibus spending bill that was 
later signed by President Obama.98 Finally, following congressional failure to pro-
mote his desired legal initiatives, President Obama signed another executive order in 
early 2016, which formed the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity.
The Commission was tasked with creating a list of recommendations on ways to 
strengthen cybersecurity measures, including for critical infrastructure.99
One possible explanation for the lack of clear legal cybersecurity principles for 
protecting critical infrastructure is that, while many believe that major attacks will 
happen soon,100 cyberattacks in the United States have not resulted in death or drastic 
damage to national security or the economy thus far. Legislators have not been com-
pelled by national emergencies to craft reactionary legislation or even to prioritize 
the creation of it, considering the lack of support from the private sector.101 Yet this 
                                                                                                                
_standards_working_group_report.cfm [https://perma.cc/CW7M-AQVS]. Reports made pub-
lic by NIST in December 2015 showed some progress in that global coordination. See 1 INT’L
CYBERSECURITY STANDARDIZATION WORKING GRP., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
INTERAGENCY REPORT ON STRATEGIC U.S. GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDIZATION TO ACHIEVE U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR CYBERSECURITY (2015), 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST.IR.8074v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8HZ-4GMP]; 
2 INT’L CYBERSECURITY STANDARDIZATION WORKING GRP., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR THE INTERAGENCY REPORT ON STRATEGIC U.S.
GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION TO ACHIEVE U.S.
OBJECTIVES FOR CYBERSECURITY (2015), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NIST 
.IR.8074v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L6V-852Z]. 
98. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, 2935–
85 (2015) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Peter Carey, Keith M. Gerver & 
Kenneth L. Wainstein, President Obama Signs Cybersecurity Act of 2015 to Encourage 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www 
.natlawreview.com/article/president-obama-signs-cybersecurity-act-2015-to-encourage-
cybersecurity-information [https://perma.cc/BT93-4TMJ]. 
99. Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13,718, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 7441 (Feb. 9, 2016). 
100. See, e.g., HAYDEN ET AL., supra note 89, at 9 (discussing the substantial secondary 
impacts of a power outage); Michael Hayden, Curt Hébert & Susan Tierney, Opinion, How 
To Protect Our Electric Grid, USA TODAY (Mar. 4, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://usat.ly/1i2vJbb 
[https://perma.cc/6LE2-4QV4]. 
101. Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation, 91 IND. L.J. 
435, 438 (2016) (explaining that law creation typically follows a pattern of boom and bust; 
after a crisis arises, public pressure for reform often impels Congress to act, creating a “bubble 
law” that is reactionary in nature); Jane Susskind, Can Legislation Ever Keep Up with 
Technology?, INDEP. VOTER NETWORK (Aug. 7, 2013), http://ivn.us/2013/08/07/can-
legislation-ever-keep-up-with-technology [https://perma.cc/BU5Z-4BKV] (“It’s generally 
known that politics trails society, with legislation acting as a reactionary function as opposed 
to a preemptive attempt to address shifting societal attitudes. In terms of technology, legisla-
tion is ‘at least five years behind,’ according to Andrea Matwyshyn, a professor at the 
University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School.”). Moreover, even when the legislature is in-
terested in passing a law, the process takes a long time, as the law has to pass the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, and the differences in the two bills must be reconciled by both 
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does not mean that cyberattacks cannot disable government operations or critical in-
frastructure operators.102 “[Seventy-four] percent of the world’s businesses expect to 
be hacked each year,” and “[t]he estimated economic loss of cybercrime is estimated 
to reach $3 trillion by 2020.”103 A 2014 study demonstrated that 61% of experts be-
lieve that “a major [cyber] attack causing widespread harm would occur by 2025.”104
Similarly, a 2015 study revealed that nearly half of critical infrastructure executives 
“believe it is likely that a cyberattack on critical infrastructure, with the potential to 
result in the loss of human life, could happen within the next three years.”105
Moreover, attacks on critical infrastructure in other regions of the world, including 
Europe,  have already taken place, and might be the reason why the EU is ahead of 
the United States when it comes to legislative initiatives aimed at protecting cyber-
security.106 Indeed, in July 2016, the EU Parliament approved cybersecurity-related 
                                                                                                                
chambers before being sent to the president for approval. This time-consuming process re-
quires knowledge of the subject matter, the ability to withstand criticism, and, equally im-
portant, the ability to persuade others. It is difficult for such a process to take place successfully 
in the absence of a drastic crisis relating to cybersecurity. See also MILES KEOGH & CHRISTINA 
CODY, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS, CYBERSECURITY FOR STATE 
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2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/partner-perspectives/intel/outof-aspen-state-of-
critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-2015/a/d-id/1321425 [https://perma.cc/XC8Y-XWGU]. 
102. Danielle Warner, Note, From Bombs and Bullets to Botnets and Bytes: Cyber War 
and the Need for a Federal Cybersecurity Agency, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 1, 11 (2012); 
see also Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, supra note 1, at 5; 
David E. Sanger, U.S. Indicts 7 Iranians in Cyberattacks on Banks and a Dam, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/world/middleeast/us-indicts-iranians-
in-cyberattacks-on-banks-and-a-dam.html [https://perma.cc/57SR-FUKL]. 
103. Brad Smith, The Need For a Digital Geneva Convention, MICROSOFT: ON THE ISSUES
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-
convention/#sm.0000diaekitjde6fuco2giewexmzj [https://perma.cc/M2SL-RCRQ] (calling on 
the world’s governments to implement international rules to protect the civilian use of the 
internet, stating that similarly to how “the Fourth Geneva Convention has long protected ci-
vilians in times of war, we now need a Digital Geneva Convention that will commit govern-
ments to protecting civilians from nation-state attacks in times of peace”).
104. PEW RESEARCH CTR., CYBER ATTACKS LIKELY TO INCREASE 6–7 (2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2014/10/PI_FutureofCyberattacks 
_102914_pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGA9-8JWE]. 
105. Press Release, Intel Corp., New Survey Reveals Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
Challenges (July 20, 2015), http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/news/2015/q3/20150720-
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as-north-korean-internet-collapses.html [https://perma.cc/PK22-89QC] (suspected attack that 
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baseline requirements. The EU’s Directive on Security of Network and Information 
Systems (“NIS Directive”),107 which is further described below, will soon institute 
the first set of standards for cybersecurity and breach reporting requirements for crit-
ical infrastructure in the EU.  
III. DIGITAL SERVICE PROVIDERS—CRITICAL ENTITIES? 
Since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, policy makers have agreed that certain 
financial institutions are systemically important and therefore too big to fail. 
Similarly, policy makers agreed on the vendors that constitute critical infrastructure 
operators subject to special risk-management procedures, including cybersecurity re-
quirements.108 Nevertheless, global, omnipotent key digital service providers, includ-
ing providers of social networks, search engines, and cloud computing, that also pro-
vide, among other things, financial-related services, have been ignored in the context 
of too-big-to-fail or critical infrastructure operators. Yet, there is no doubt that key 
digital service providers deliver essential services to our economy and social lives 
and should therefore be considered Critical Service Providers.  
One reason that digital service providers have not been categorized as such could 
be the widespread belief that the technology industry has not been plagued by the 
too-big-to-fail issue. The assumption has been that technology companies come and 
go, acquiring each other, while their clients transition to other companies’ products 
and services as needed.109 Indeed, although major technology companies’ products 
and services have failed, and there have even been technology companies that failed 
in their entirety, perhaps producing some type of ripple effects, no damage to the 
overall system has been recorded as a result as of yet. But this does not mean that 
such damage is not possible.  
Another explanation could be that in many countries the private sector controls 
most of the cyber-relevant critical infrastructure. For example, in the United States, 
virtually all key internet services and vital digital service providers are private enti-
ties, and the private sector controls over 85% of cyber-relevant critical infrastruc-
ture.110 Therefore, if global key digital service providers were to be defined as critical 
infrastructure entities, they would be subject to increased regulation. And although 
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some private entities do support “carefully crafted and narrowly tailored” legisla-
tion,111 like the Cybersecurity Act of 2015,112 the private sector in general is less 
inclined to adopt more laws or regulations that would require compliance with par-
ticular standards for technology.113 The private sector uses four explanations to ra-
tionalize its objections: First, such requirements are likely to generate higher business 
expenses and misdirection of business resources.114 Second, businesses would be re-
quired to comply with measures that rapidly become obsolete and futile at the ex-
pense of addressing current and future threats.115 Third, such regulation would dis-
courage public-private partnerships, which are presumably already covering the 
issue.116 Fourth, more regulation is not guaranteed to enhance cybersecurity, and the 
public sector has not, historically, provided ideal protection against cyberattacks.117  
But a megafailure or disastrous malfunctioning of key digital service providers, 
their services, or their products, could shock the country’s security, economy, na-
tional public health, and safety.118 And the likelihood of this happening as a result of 
a cyberattack is becoming more and more likely. In general, key digital service pro-
viders are exposed to failures that could be the result of various IT issues—from 
technical failures, which can include unnoticed or unresolved IT problems, or busi-
ness interruption coverage, including systems failure, to malicious attacks, such as 
attacks exploiting online vulnerabilities as well as physical infrastructure. 
Differently, failures could be the result of financial issues or governance matters, 
including decisions regarding cyber extortion and digital asset management and res-
toration. But, either way, all types of failures can lead to more, different, new, and 
critical IT failures, financial failures, or governance failures that have extreme nega-
tive consequences that go beyond the scope of the entity in which they arose. This is 
because any of these failures can result in consumers losing confidence in the digital 
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world, businesses losing massive amounts of money, e-government initiatives be-
coming ineffective, and even national security being put at stake.  
By launching a cyberattack, cyberattackers can make prominent websites unavail-
able, causing severe damage to those relying on them. For example, according to 
estimates, a recent four-hour outage of Amazon’s S3 cloud storage system that was 
not the result of a cyberattack, cost S&P 500 companies at least $150 million.119
Accordingly, losses resulting from a large-scale attack on a cloud service are esti-
mated in the billions. Otherwise, a cyberattack on traditional physical infrastructure, 
like the one that took out a large parts of the grid in Kiev, Ukraine, in December 
2016, is also a concern.120  
Realizing this, one would expect the potential IT, financial, corporate, and gov-
ernance issues that can cause massive services, products, and even entity-wide fail-
ures to be closely regulated and monitored, but in reality that is not the case. The 
reason is that it is very difficult to model a cyber disaster, in part because one has not 
happened yet, and in part because it is challenging to try to quantify cyber risks. 
Additionally, understanding the geography of the internet, which is also important to 
evaluating the risk of big cyberattacks, is also quite complex. One needs a “map” of 
the locations where valuable data are stored, as well as information about how well 
the owners of those assets protect them. 
Either way, identifying key digital service providers as Critical Service Providers 
whose potential failures should be closely monitored is justified based on such enti-
ties’ (i) size, (ii) power, importance, and lines of business, and (iii) impact on internet 
services, which qualify as critical infrastructure.  
A. Size 
First, size does matter. Size is a proxy for power, and large entities have signifi-
cant effects on the ecosystems and societies in which they operate. Large companies 
enjoy bargaining power in many areas, not just with customers. They can also refuse 
to comply with or even push back against governmental requests. In 2016, for exam-
ple, the FBI was unable to force Apple and Amazon to cooperate with requests for 
information and resorted to taking the issues to court.121 Larger businesses enjoy far 
greater access to capital than smaller ones, have high market value, and are arguably 
valued at higher multiples, everything else being equal.  
The technology sector is responsible for approximately 6% of the U.S. economy 
and was valued at nearly $1 trillion in GDP for 2014 alone, helped in no small part 
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by the contributions of the biggest digital service providers.122 The “frightful five”—
Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, and Alphabet, Google’s parent company (col-
lectively, AFAMA)—control nearly everything of value in the digital world, includ-
ing operating systems, application stores, browsers, cloud storage infrastructure, and 
oceans of data from which to spin new products. Alphabet, Apple, Facebook, and 
Amazon generated together $433 billion in revenues in 2015, placing them at the 
same level as a mid-sized economy in terms of financial volume and economic 
strength.123 Moreover, experts have long said that if Apple, which is the number one 
firm in the NASDAQ in terms of market cap and revenue,124 takes a big hit, the mar-
kets will sink drastically and everyone will feel the pain.125 Indeed, in 2015, it was 
estimated that Apple accounted for 0.5% of the U.S. GDP, and 0.15% of the global 
GDP, and in May 2017, Apple shares hit an all-time high, putting the company’s 
market value at more than $800 billion.126 Similarly, Alphabet’s Google, as of 
October 2016, was responsible for 90% of the worldwide search market127—and 
gave Apple a fight in early 2016, when Alphabet became the world’s most valuable 
public company,128 even if only for a short period of time.129 Apple’s massive market 
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cap is still trailed by Microsoft ($476.9 billion),130 Amazon ($358 billion),131 and 
Facebook ($350 billion).132  
Recognizing the size of key digital service providers, Senator Elizabeth Warren 
argued in summer 2016 against their growing impact on our society and economy 
and the unfair advantages and incentives they receive.133 “[The] idea of “too big to 
fail” in the financial sector gets a lot of attention . . . . But the problem isn’t unique 
to the financial sector,” she said.134 “It’s hiding in plain sight all across the American 
economy.”135 Giants like Google, which asserted in 2012 that it had boosted the econ-
omy by $80 billion through its advertising functionality alone and transformed the 
world in ways that transcend economic analysis, should not be treated as favorably 
as the biggest banks following the 2008 financial crisis.136
B. Political and Financial Influence 
The power and importance of key digital service providers, including AFAMA, 
can stretch far beyond their mere size, impressive market level, or relationships with 
consumers. These entities have become political and even geopolitical as they reach 
levels of influence and impact forbidden to even the largest financial institutions.137
In fact, AFAMA’s influence now derives from the ability of these companies to re-
define a broad spectrum of political and societal realities. And while several govern-
ments, including the U.S. government, have threatened implausibly to break up the 
biggest banks if they do not comply with new laws and requirements,138 it is even 
less likely that any state power will threaten to break up a company like Alphabet.139  
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AFAMA’s influence in today’s world also redefines the very notion of politics 
and governance.140 After the recent U.S. elections, many individuals wondered about 
the impact of Alphabet141 and Facebook—with its 1.79 billion monthly active users 
and 1.18 billion daily active users142—on the news ecosystem, questioning whether 
these companies have too much power and might be too big.143 These questions be-
came especially relevant after it became clear that 64% of U.S. internet users who 
read the news on social media sites do so on only one site, mainly Facebook.144
Moreover, the death of distribution-based economic power has led media companies 
and other businesses to rely on powerful intermediaries such as Facebook and 
Google, which own the customer experience and commoditize their suppliers.145
These companies immerse users in their sites rather than driving traffic elsewhere; 
consequently, in some developing countries users are not even aware of using the 
internet—to them it is all Facebook.146
AFAMA’s influence even redefines geographical organization and structure.147
AFAMA actively promotes libertarian values as they relate to encryption,148 for 
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example, whether or not these values clash with the goals of other organizations that 
AFAMA presumably supports.149 AFAMA also redefines notions of community: 
Facebook rewrote the definitions of “friend,” “group,” and what it means to “like” 
something or sympathize with someone, while Amazon may forever change the con-
cept of geographical distance by attempting to reduce it to the bare minimum through 
ever-faster delivery.150
Moreover, AFAMA and similar companies have made it clear in the last few years 
that they are interested in disrupting and reshaping the financial industry and have 
started to compete with traditional financial service providers; aided by the enormous 
success and rapid growth of financial technology,151 they have already captured a 
portion of the sector’s financial profits.152 Offering products that range from payment 
and money transfer systems and loans to credit assessment, funds management, and 
online trades, the digital service providers have captured the attention of consumers, 
especially younger ones who prefer to bank with them, as well as competitors, aca-
demics, and regulators.153 Moreover, in November 2015, Google, Amazon, and 
Apple started a financial regulation lobbying group, Financial Innovation Now, and 
in December 2016, Facebook unveiled its “newly acquired licenses for e-money and 
payment services out of Ireland,” approximately a year after securing a patent for a 
new financial credit-scoring system.154 As a result, commentators have already 
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started advocating for such institutions to be viewed as financial institutions and the 
biggest ones as SIFIs.155  
C. A Society Dependent on Cloud Computing 
Additionally, some have expressed fear regarding the damage that could be done 
to government operations, financial infrastructure, and cyber-social systems if 
cyberattacks were to take place against one of these key digital service providers.156
For example, “in addition to its digital media prowess, fashion lines, hardware sales,”
and marketplace lending services, Amazon “is also the dominant player in the cloud 
services segment,” which now hosts everything from television shows to financial 
information and even the CIA’s intelligence data157—a significant change from a few 
years ago, when government agencies, including the CIA, were reluctant to use cloud 
services, particularly those provided by private companies.158 However, two trends 
have pushed institutions towards the cloud, even as some agencies remain unclear on 
its complexities: (i) increasing specialization in technology’s functionality and oper-
ation and difficulty of local installation and management and (ii) increasingly reliable 
and dependable cloud-based networks.159 Realizing this, some government agencies 
initially attempted to own the entire cloud process and create homegrown enterprise 
cloud systems, but those proved harder to execute than imagined, which led the agen-
cies to outsource their cloud strategy. The Department of Defense (DoD) created 
various cloud security policies and established procedures in the event of cyber 
incidents; in December 2014, it issued a memorandum allowing DoD agencies to 
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posed by nonbank players, particularly in the payments industry.” Kristin Broughton, Apple 
Pay a Systemic Risk? Banker Warns About Nonbank Players, AM. BANKER (Nov. 21, 2014,
11:43 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/apple-pay-a-systemic-
risk-banker-warns-about-nonbank-players-1071357-1.html [https://perma.cc/4CQY-YM2K]. 
156. At least a few banks expressed concerns about the amount of personal and financial 
information Apple is collecting about the banks’ customers, fearing that the same data “could 
serve as a beachhead for an invasion of the banking industry.” Christopher Williams, UK
Banks in Talks over Apple “Wave and Pay,” TELEGRAPH (Dec. 27, 2014, 7:29 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/telecoms/11
312574/UK-banks-in-talks-over-Apple-wave-and-pay.html [https://perma.cc/UUJ8-WEWR]. 
157. See Neiger, supra note 16 (emphasis omitted).
158. See Hannah Moss, DoD and the Cloud, GOVLOOP (June 24, 2015), 
https://www.govloop.com/dod-and-the-cloud [https://perma.cc/HMS9-N54Q]. 
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purchase cloud computing services directly from private cloud service providers,160
while trying to make it as easy and safe as possible to use the cloud services.161  
As mentioned, Amazon is currently the biggest cloud services company, but it is 
not the only key digital service provider offering such services to critical infrastruc-
ture operators. Google, for example, is doing the same thing.162 According to experts, 
however, Amazon’s share of the market will increase even more; along with 
Microsoft, it is predicted to take over 76% of the cloud business, which the financial 
industry is becoming extremely dependent on, and that will be worth about $32.9 
billion in 2017.163  
In the years following the 2008 financial crisis, it has become clear that major 
nonbank institutions could also pose risks to the financial system and therefore 
should be monitored similarly to SIFIs.164 By the end of 2014, regulators went so far 
as to designate several nonbanks as SIFIs.165 Similarly, the Federal Reserve has re-
cently announced that it will soon issue rules for insurance companies—which by 
nature also provide financial services, as was clearly demonstrated by AIG’s involve-
ment in the 2008 crisis—deemed too big to fail that will minimize risks to U.S. 
financial stability.166  
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163. Id. In addition to the large financial scale of this business, it is important to note that 
the main entities offering cloud computing services also get exposed to much more data than 
other businesses. Indeed, research shows “that cloud computing does result in the collection 
of more private information, but this mostly happens voluntarily.” Konstantinos K. Stylianou, 
An Evolutionary Study of Cloud Computing Services Privacy Terms, 27 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 593, 594 (2010). 
164. In the case of nonbanks, section 113 of the Dodd–Frank Act left the question of which 
entities qualify as SIFIs to the FSOC. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5323 (West 2014). Nonbanks identified 
as SIFIs are subject to consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve and enhanced pruden-
tial standards in a manner similar to the Bank Holding Company Act model of regulation and 
supervision. Id. §§ 5325(a), 5365(i)–(j).
165. Thus far, such entities include: AIG; Prudential Financial; GE Capital, which was able 
to restructure itself to no longer qualify; and Metlife, which has argued against this designa-
tion. Financial Stability Oversight Council: Designations, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (June 29, 
2016, 9:48 AM), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/QW3F-SPTB]. 
166. Lisa Lambert, Rules for “Too Big To Fail” Insurance Firms Coming Soon: Fed 
Official, REUTERS (May 20, 2016, 9:35 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-
insurance-idUSKCN0YB1M9 [https://perma.cc/8WLY-NVBK]. 
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D. The Internet as Critical Service 
The internet can and probably should be viewed as a critical infrastructure. Over 
the last few years its importance as a critical infrastructure for national defense ac-
tivities, energy resources, finance, transportation, and fundamental daily life pursuits 
for billions of individuals has become greater than ever.167 So much of U.S. infra-
structure is online that “gaining control of or disrupting” the country’s key digital 
service providers is likely to “become a critical goal in future conflicts.”168 Experts 
have “varying opinions about the likely extent of damage and disruption [to 
cyberinfrastructure] at the nation-state level,” but many predict that the “current
cyber arms race dynamic will expand as nations and other groups . . . ceaselessly 
work to overcome security measures.”169 Given the potential extreme damage of a 
lethal cyberattack, some have questioned if a voluntary framework will be sufficient 
to ensure that private companies, including the world’s leading digital service provid-
ers, adequately protect our critical infrastructure sectors.170  
Recognizing this, in 2016 the EU Parliament announced its NIS Directive, which 
aims to cover two types of entities. First, it concerns “essential service operators” 
within the energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, health, drink-
ing water, and digital infrastructure sectors, arguing that “digital infrastructures’” or 
“e-infrastructures’” activity aims at empowering researchers with easy and con-
trolled online access to facilities, resources, and collaboration tools, bringing to them 
the power of ICT for computing, connectivity, data storage, and access to virtual 
research environments.171 According to the NIS Directive, the criteria for identifying 
the operators of essential services are: (i) an entity provides a service which is 
essential for the maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activities, (ii) the 
provision of that service depends on network and information systems, and (iii) an 
incident would have significant disruptive effects on the provision of that service.172
Second, and more importantly for this Article’s purpose, “digital service providers,” 
including entities such as online marketplaces, online search engines, and cloud 
computing service providers,173 appear in the NIS Directive, even if they are subject 
to a lighter regulatory touch than essential service operators. This European inclusion 
is partly the result of more and more European data moving online and a presumed 
attempt by the European Union to ensure that networks such as Amazon Web 
                                                                                                                
167. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 104, at 5. Needless to say, what regulators should 
and would require of critical infrastructure, too-big-to-fail financial institutions, and too-big-
to-fail banks vary depending on the industry and type of institutions involved, and hence the 
different rules for the insurance firms.
168. Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Id. at 9.
170. JONES DAY, supra note 113, at 2; see also Nagesh, supra note 113. 
171. See Digital Infrastructures, EUR. COMMISSION (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-infrastructures [https://perma.cc/LSQ3-
7UBH].
172. “[O]perator of essential services” means a public or private entity of a type referred 
to in Annex II of the NIS Directive, which meets the criteria laid down in Article 5(2) of the 
NIS Directive. NIS Directive, supra note 19, at 14, 28–29. 
173. Id. at 7. 
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Services (AWS) and Google Drive, which store vast amounts of data, are not 
compromised and suffer minimal downtime.174 Moreover, this inclusion is meant to 
help identify and monitor “key operators of essential services and networks, such as 
online banking,” given the potential harm to society and the economy that could 
result from their collapse or severe breach.175 This inclusion of digital service 
providers did not go uncontested. An earlier proposal agreed upon by the EU 
Parliament in March 2014 did not include “enablers of key internet services” such as 
Google, Amazon and Facebook—so-called over-the-top companies.176 Later on, 
however, policy makers agreed to include them,177 as reflected in the NIS 
Directive.178  
According to media reports, the considerable disagreement regarding the inclu-
sion of digital service providers in the NIS Directive was due to the objections of 
many of the entities falling under the definition of digital service provider. In partic-
ular, these opponents argued that cyberattacks on digital service providers were in-
significant, and that additional regulation would potentially detract from innovation. 
But policy makers insisted on precautions to guarantee the security of digital infra-
structure, requiring companies like Google to report key breaches to data protection 
authorities.179  
Given all of the above, key digital service providers should be viewed as Critical 
Service Providers, as in some respects they bear similar responsibility and liability 
to the ones SIFIs and critical infrastructure operators do. Indeed, while the type of 
damages and their impact greatly varies, society is reliant on these institutions, and 
their potential failure, or the failures of some of their key services or products, can 
cause a massive ripple effect. This makes these institutions extremely important and 
their potential failures will be referred to herein as Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0.  
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internet [https://perma.cc/3ZBV-7GR3]. 
177. Allison Grande, EU Cybersecurity Rules Increase Liability for Multinationals,
LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2015, 11:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/735622/eu-
cybersecurity-rules-increase-liability-for-multinationals [https://perma.cc/357J-JFYM]. 
178. Grande, supra note 108.
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IV. RISKS AND CHALLENGES
A. Cybersecurity and Threats 
Considering the importance of cybersecurity, baseline requirements for risk man-
agement and mitigation are long overdue—particularly in the financial industry, 
which has suffered from many attacks in recent years. In February 2016, for example, 
cyber criminals stole more than $81 million from the Bangladesh central bank’s hold-
ings in the New York Federal Reserve Bank.180 They did so using the credentials of 
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), whose 
network enables financial institutions worldwide to send and receive information 
about financial transactions in a secure, standardized, and reliable environment. The 
2016 cyberattack was concerning given that the majority of international interbank 
messages use the SWIFT network.181 Likewise, the FDIC has suffered dozens of 
cyberattacks since 2010 which have infected the computers of former Chairwoman 
Sheila Bair and other officials.182 In an attack in October 2015, a massive cybersecu-
rity breach affected more than 40,000 individuals and 30,000 banks.183 Unwilling to 
disclose the scale of the breach, the FDIC grossly misrepresented the number of af-
fected individuals and entities.184  
But while attacks on cybersecurity with substantial long-term physical effects are 
less likely to materialize, other threats involving information infrastructures are quite 
possible. Certainly, there is a substantial danger during many conventional catastro-
phes that a supportive information infrastructure will become overloaded and crash, 
thus preventing societal recovery. The absence of a clear governmental response in 
such situations may cause public panic if there appears to be no clear path back to 
normalcy. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that both the media and government officials have 
been paying more attention to the potential scenarios that could result from lethal 
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cyberattacks.185 In August 2015, for the first time, U.S. regulators advised financial 
institutions to include cyber risk analysis in their Dodd-Frank Act mandated living 
wills, as part of their general strategic planning. The FDIC stressed that “[i]n addition 
to preparing for natural disasters and other physical threats, continuity now also 
means preserving access to customer data and the integrity and security of that data 
in the face of cyberattacks.”186 Then, in June 2016, SEC Chair Mary Jo White de-
scribed cybersecurity as “one of the greatest risks facing the financial services indus-
try and will be for the foreseeable future.”187 Several months later, in fall 2016, the 
state of New York188 and a number of federal agencies proposed new regulations to 
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address cybersecurity challenges to financial service institutions.189 Among the pro-
posed regulations are provisions suggesting that entities that provide a sector-critical 
system should be required to “substantially mitigate the risk of a disruption due to a 
cyber event.”190 Similarly, the regulators are considering whether it might be appro-
priate to determine which entities should be covered under some of these cybersecu-
rity initiatives based on the number of connections that a particular entity, its affili-
ates, and third-party service providers have with other entities throughout the 
financial sector—as opposed to doing so based on asset size. Furthermore, the regu-
lators are considering whether such enhanced cyber risk management standards 
should apply directly to third-party service providers of financial entities that are 
covered under the new initiatives, rather than placing oversight responsibility for 
service providers on the financial entity itself, in an effort to ensure consistent appli-
cation and oversight of such standards regardless of whether it is a third-party service 
provider of the financial entity that works with it that performs a relevant operation. 
Finally, regulators are contemplating requiring domestic and international covered 
entities with sector critical systems, as well as relevant third parties, which provide 
                                                                                                                
189. Attempting to curb systemic cyber threats, the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, and 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency approved an advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking (ANPR) regarding potential “enhanced standards for the largest and most inter-
connected entities under their supervision, as well as for services that these entities receive 
from third parties” on October 19, 2016. See Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards, 
81 Fed. Reg. 74,315 (proposed Oct. 26, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 30, 364 & ch. 
II). The ANPR is intended to address “cyber contagion”—that is, the risk that “a cyber incident 
or failure at one interconnected entity may not only impact the safety and soundness of the 
entity, but also other financial entities with potentially systemic consequences.” Id. at 74,316, 
74,324. The ANPR proposes that all covered institutions meet a minimum standard and that 
“those entities that are critical to the functioning of the financial sector” meet “more stringent 
standards.” Id. at 74,315. The enhanced cyber risk management standards described in the 
ANPR would apply on an enterprise-wide basis to banking organizations and financial insti-
tutions with U.S. $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets—including, among others, 
financial market utilities designated as systemically important by the FSOC, financial market 
infrastructures for which the Board exercises primary supervisory authority, and nonbank fi-
nancial companies subject to enhanced supervision and prudential standards under Section 
165 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Similarly, in September 2016, the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC) updated its Information Technology Handbook to incorporate 
revised examination expectations with respect to information security. FFIEC Information 
Technology Examination Handbook, Information Security, Sept. 2016, 
http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/216407/informationsecurity2016booklet.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/CCY5-379C]. Additionally, in late 2016, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) published guidance on financial institutions’ reporting of 
cyber events in connection with their submission of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), as 
required under the Bank Secrecy Act and FinCEN’s Anti-Money Laundering regulations. 
Advisory to Financial Institutions on Cyber-Events and Cyber-Enabled Crime, FinCEN, Oct. 
25, 2016, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2016-10-25/Cyber%20Threats 
%20Advisory%20-%20FINAL%20508_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/S23W-3AXA] (stating that 
the “proliferation of cyber-events and cyber-enabled crime represents a significant threat to 
consumers and the U.S. financial system”). 
190. Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards, 81 Fed. Reg. at 74,319, 74,320.  
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sector-critical systems, to establish procedures regarding returning to full operational 
ability within two hours of a cyber event.191
B. Preparedness and Awareness? 
The 2008 crisis resulted in large part from the regulatory financial system, which 
was flawed, fragmented, and out of touch with current technology and financial 
mechanisms. Considering the state of the regulatory cyber risk management system, 
the present situation is not much different. Most institutions have traditionally 
viewed cybersecurity as an IT problem despite current awareness that cybersecurity 
constitutes a broader risk management issue necessitating risk-based decision mak-
ing.192 Technology’s evolution is constantly outpacing regulators, and the speedy 
growth we have witnessed in financial technology markets such as payments and 
marketplace lending is often tricky to understand, monitor, and regulate. Similarly, 
the rapid growth and advancement of cloud computing services, search engines, and 
data processing features, and social networks’ related products, have also proved dif-
ficult to standardize legally, ethically, and socially. 
As a result of the 2008 crisis, U.S. financial institutions enhanced their risk man-
agement, following the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirements, which are not ideal but at 
least included the creation of risk management committees and the preparation and 
submission of disaster plans. This exercise, which is not bulletproof, does not really 
mention cyber risks and only applies to financial institutions, not digital service pro-
viders. And the fragmented global patchwork of laws that imposes varying and often 
incoherent rules on business institutions, such as data security and breach reporting 
mandates, is in place only in some jurisdictions, while in others there are no specific 
requirements. And until 2016, when New York State issued its Cybersecurity 
Regulations for Financial Service Companies, which was the first of its kind in the 
United States,193 no state laws mandated that major institutions internalize cyber-
related risks, test their own cybersecurity, prepare for disastrous consequences, or 
purchase cyber insurance. But New York’s new laws do not relate to nonfinancial 
private-sector companies or to key digital service providers, and that might be prob-
lematic. New York’s new measures only require banks, insurance companies, and 
other financial services institutions regulated by the state’s Department of Financial 
Services (DFS) to establish and maintain a cybersecurity program designed to protect 
consumers’ private data and ensure the safety and soundness of the state’s massive 
financial services industry. This legislation was not created in a vacuum. According 
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to a study conducted in 2016 by the Ponemon Institute, 66% of the 2400 security and 
IT professionals interviewed said that their organization was not prepared to recover 
from cyberattacks.194 Moreover, 75% of respondents admitted that no formal 
cybersecurity incident response plan (CSIRP) was applied consistently across their 
organizations; of those with a CSIRP in place, 52% had either not reviewed or 
updated it since it was put into place or had no set plan for doing so.195 Even more 
concerning, most entities participating in this study had experienced a data breach in 
the past year, and 57% of respondents reported that their entities had suffered from 
a data breach involving the loss or theft of more than 1000 records, including 
sensitive or confidential professional information, in the past two years. And while 
legislative initiatives have been made to encourage public companies to appoint 
cybersecurity experts to their boards of directors, such legislative attempts have yet 
to be successful.196  
Key digital service providers, despite their size and importance to our economy, 
are not legally required to manage their business risks, including cyber risks. Indeed, 
U.S. cybersecurity laws and regulations date back to the 1980s, but historically fo-
cused almost exclusively on punishing hackers or penalizing companies that failed 
to secure sensitive information. And, despite digital service providers’ presumed 
technical expertise, much like other businesses, they have also been exposed to 
cyberattacks. For example, in 2016–2017 alone, most key digital service providers 
suffered from significant cyberattacks. In 2018, scandalous reports came out about 
Facebook’s handling of user information that resulted in Cambridge Analytica’s ac-
cess to the data of 50–90 million Facebook users, which may have impacted the 2016 
presidential election.197 Prior to that, Facebook also proved vulnerable to breaches 
when the company admitted that links and malicious files had been sent through its 
program to hack into users’ accounts, and even the U.S. president Donald Trump was 
informed of these risks and their potential impact, given his extensive use of social 
media.198 In addition, data hacks and leaks dating back to 2012 had caused technical 
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glitches in Facebook’s massive archive of contact information that was collected 
from 1.1 billion users worldwide.199 As a result of the glitches, Facebook users who 
downloaded contact data for their list of friends obtained additional private infor-
mation.200
Similarly, in December 2018, reports came out about a new Google+ blunder,
which exposed data from 52.5 million users.201 In November 2016, reports came out 
disclosing that a new variant of Android malware was responsible for the theft of 
what was believed to be more than 1.3 million Google accounts.202 And, in July 2016, 
Google’s parent company, Alphabet, revealed that it was subject to approximately 
4000 state-sponsored cyberattacks on users per month.203
Similarly, the non-key but nonetheless famous digital service provider Yahoo, a 
search engine that also provides email services, admitted in September 2016 that 
hackers had stolen data on 500 million users in 2014;204 in December 2016, the world 
learned that in 2013 one billion Yahoo accounts were compromised.205 Other major 
digital service providers, including Amazon, also endured cyberattacks in 2016.206
Likewise, in 2016, Apple not only had to ascertain how the U.S. government had 
cracked its iPhone,207 but it also had to release a patched version of its latest mobile 
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software, iOS 9.3.5, after one of the world’s most evasive digital arms dealers alleg-
edly took advantage of several security vulnerabilities in its products to spy on dis-
sidents and journalists.208 Apple also dealt with security breaches relating to the 
usernames, passwords, and other information for thirteen million users of 
MacKeeper, a performance-optimizing software for Apple computers.209 Finally, as 
previously discussed, in May 2017, attackers took advantage of Microsoft software 
vulnerabilities and over the course of several days disrupted operations in more than 
150 countries.210  
While these cyberattacks and hacks on the largest global digital service providers 
vary in their severity and scope, it is clear that these entities are neither safe nor any 
more resilient than the largest financial institutions or other critical infrastructure 
operators. Moreover, unlike some other industries’ entities, such as financial institu-
tions, which are now legally required to at least try to enhance their risk management 
efforts, it is unclear how much U.S. digital service providers are improving their risk 
management procedures in an attempt to prevent the potentially dire consequences 
of cyberattacks.211  
In the EU, the regulatory landscape is a bit stricter for digital service providers; 
the July 2016 NIS Directive attempted to formalize what used to be considered best 
practices into actual legal obligations. Yet, even in the EU, the legal standards re-
garding risk internalization and management are still vague and interpretations of 
them vary among the member states, producing a patchwork of mismatched adop-
tions of the law.  
C. Expectations and Public Choice Theory  
As mentioned above, the U.S. private sector controls over 85% of cyber-relevant 
critical infrastructure. And if key digital service providers were to be defined as 
Critical Service Providers, they would be subject to more scrutiny and regulation, 
which the private sector is less inclined to adopt given its opposition to cybersecurity 
regulations that would mandate compliance with specific principles or technology.212
Within a risk-based cybersecurity approach, private businesses assess the probability 
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of cyberattacks at different levels of magnitude and the costs and methods needed to 
prevent each type of attack.213 Businesses may not be inclined to allocate a great deal 
of funds and effort to protect against such attacks;214 some may simply buy insurance 
to cover these unlikely threats.215 Private-sector businesses also lack incentive to in-
vest in protection against successful and disruptive critical infrastructure cyberat-
tacks if they do not internalize their negative and positive externalities.216 For exam-
ple, if cyberattackers ruin a power generation facility, the operator may need to spend 
funds on a new digital infrastructure and may lose some revenue from its cus-
tomers.217 But because such a facility is viewed as part of the critical infrastructure, 
the government will pick the lesser evil and step in to help with purchasing the sys-
tems and catching the attacker.218 Thus, the consumers will ultimately suffer the con-
sequences—albeit reduced due to the intervention—of this attack while they remain 
without power.219
Thus, financial considerations may be the largest obstacle preventing companies 
from protecting themselves from cyber threats. However, the government should not 
simply dispense money when private businesses are not investing for their own pro-
tection. The private sector should better manage the risks related to cybersecurity 
issues even if doing so results in financial gains that do not surpass the expense of 
guarding against these threats.220 The government should offer assistance and en-
couragement to help businesses offset these expenses. Yet the fear remains that 
“[d]amages in the billions will occur to manufacturing and/or utilities but because it 
ramps up slowly, it will be accepted as just another cost (probably passed on to tax-
payers through government rebuilding subsidies and/or environmental damage), and 
there will be little motivation for the private sector to defend itself. . . . The primary 
issue is a lack of policy/political/economic incentives and willpower to address the 
problem.”221
Addressing this problem could also be done using public choice theory tools, 
which apply concepts from economics to an analysis of political behavior. In the 
traditional “public interest” view, public officials are “public servants” who devot-
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edly perform the will of the people. In promoting the public’s interest, voters, politi-
cians, and legislators are believed to be capable somehow of ignoring their own nar-
row concerns and promoting the greater good. But in modeling the behavior of 
individuals as driven by the goal of utility maximization, public choice theory trans-
fers the rational actor model of economic theory to the realm of politics. Public 
choice theorists assume that individuals care about their own interests and are led 
mainly by those interests in the political process, just as these interests steer their 
other daily functions.222 As such, voters vote for candidates that they believe will 
better their own lives, and politicians seek to advance their own careers or get 
reelected to office.223 Thus, public and private choice processes differ, not because 
the motivations of actors are different, but because of stark differences in the incen-
tives and constraints that channel the pursuit of self-interest in the two settings.224
But public choice scholars have identified even deeper problems with democratic 
decision-making processes. The logic of collective action reinforces lawmaking that 
caters to the interests of the minority at the expense of the majority. Small groups 
with strong communities of interest are more successful suppliers of political pres-
sure and political support than big groups whose interests are more dispersed.225
After all, members of smaller groups have more individual stake in advantageous 
policy decisions, can organize at lower cost, and can more easily control issues that 
might challenge the accomplishment of their shared goals.226 Because the vote in-
centive motivates politicians seeking reelection to respond to the demands of small, 
well-organized groups, representative democracy frequently leads to this tyranny of 
the minority.  
The logic of collective action explains how digital service providers have lever-
aged their size to secure favorable government treatment and advantages such as too-
                                                                                                                
222. “We learn from Public Choice theory that theory for which James Buchanan won the 
Nobel prize in economics in 1986 that public servants act in their own interest just as much as 
corporate moguls do.” Hon. Daniel Oliver, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks Before 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Feb. 18, 1988), 1988 WL 1025382, at *4. 
223. See Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 
N.C. L. REV. 745, 750 (2013) (noting that regulators can pursue their own interests when their 
actions and legislation are not scrutinized by the electorate). 
224. See, e.g., Melissa Waters & William J. Moore, The Theory of Economic Regulation 
and Public Choice and the Determinants of Public Sector Bargaining Legislation, 66 PUB.
CHOICE 161 (1990).  
225. For more on special interest groups and their power, see generally EAMON BUTLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY—A PRIMER, THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 34–39 (2012), 
https://iea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IEA%20Public%20Choice%20web%20complete 
%2029.1.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZJY-Z22N]; WILLIAM H. RIKER, THEORY OF POLITICAL 
COALITIONS (1962); Amitai Etzioni, Special Interest Groups Versus Constituency
Representation, 8 RES. SOC. MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS & CHANGE 171 (1985). 
226. “Under the public choice theory, public policies with broad benefits and concentrated 
costs, like the Dodd-Frank Act, generally have well-organized opposition, as was the case with 
the Wall Street lobby. The resulting policy, then, tends to be only as strong as the minority 
bearing the costs is willing to pay . . . . Main Street demanded action, but the Wall Street 
Lobby made it nearly impossible for Congress to come to agreement on many details of the 
bill.” Alison K. Gary, Comment, Creating a Future Economic Crisis: Political Failure and 
the Loopholes of the Volcker Rule, 90 OR. L. REV. 1339, 1366–67 (2012). 
1254 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:1211 
big-to-jail status. Apple, Amazon, and Google’s lobbying group, Financial 
Innovation Now, is defined as “an alliance of technology leaders working to mod-
ernize the way consumers and businesses manage money and conduct commerce.”227
The group’s goal is to promote policies that enable these innovations.228 By trading 
votes in favor of protectionism for pledges of support from politicians, representa-
tives of the technology industry ensure that these policies are approved. Many pro-
grams of this sort are also packaged in omnibus bills that policy makers support in 
order to pass their pet projects. And the results are apparent. Today’s biggest digital 
service providers, in addition to operating based on a cost-benefit analysis and a risk-
based approach to cybersecurity, enjoy market supremacy and governmental back-
ing. Despite reports that Google paid Apple approximately $1 billion in 2015 to be 
the default search engine in its operating system, for example, federal regulators have 
shown no interest in pursuing the company, reinforcing the validity of public choice 
theory and antitrust enforcement.229 Politically appointed FTC commissioners have 
declined to take any action beyond extracting settlements,230 and the DOJ has not 
taken a stand; state attorneys continue to probe Google’s conduct, but given the dis-
interest of federal regulators, Google may already be too-big-to-jail231—considered 
unstoppable by the market and hence the safest investment. 
D. Should We Care About Failure?  
The elevated probability of some kind of failure or disastrous malfunctioning of 
key digital service providers, their services, or their products as a result of cyberat-
tacks, the risks and potential damages of such attacks to our economy and society, 
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and the lack of transparent, binding, and much-needed cyber-related risk internaliza-
tion and management principles make Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0 a bigger problem than 
many may want to believe.  
 1. Innovation and Competition  
Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0 may not appear to be a valid concern given that failure, in 
the way it manifests itself in the financial sector, is not necessarily a problem in the 
technology industry. Arguably, in the tech sector, competitors can always disrupt the 
industry by targeting existing services or goods and adapting them to a new digital 
reality using new technologies or a platform approach.232 Moreover, history teaches 
us that in fast-moving industries, driven by fast-changing technologies, barriers to 
entry may be less significant. The nature of the business means that technology com-
panies are vulnerable to the “next big thing,” and that concept promotes entrepre-
neurship and innovation. For example, Airbnb, Uber, Netflix, and Tesla all rose to 
power by creating markets inconceivable to their predecessors. The NASDAQ land-
scape may be considerably different in several years, with new brands dominating 
different sub-industries. This was the case with Microsoft. In the 1970s, IBM held a 
monopoly on the hardware of computers. Deciding to outsource the development of 
the operating system to Microsoft, and the development of chips to Intel, both outside 
and small-business entities, IBM ended up ceding control of the software industry to 
those two new players.233 Then, a few years down the line, a similar story happened 
again when Microsoft, which grew to rule the technology world, seemed unstoppable 
until the natural course of the market slowed it down. Indeed, for years, Microsoft’s 
monopoly in computer software leveraged tremendous influence that challenged reg-
ulators234 and appeared to be unparalleled. Eventually, however, creativity, innova-
tive ideas, and corporate reinvention resulted in major market changes that curbed 
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Microsoft better than any regulator could.235 Massive institutions routinely attempt 
to force a new economic and societal paradigm in the name of efficiency and con-
nectedness; ultimately, however, consumers determine whether this paradigm will 
take hold.236
The too-big-to-fail-related issues, if any, that plagued digital service providers in 
the past were antitrust cases, such as the ones brought decades ago against IBM and 
Microsoft, and questioned whether they were abusing their monopolistic power in
the marketplace. Some of these antitrust-related issues, as well as others, are still 
very relevant today in connection with the biggest tech companies. In particular, a 
key issue with the tech giants’ monopolistic power results from the fact that they 
have been allowed to simply acquire and absorb any potential future competitors. 
And, this has been their strategy in recent decades in order to stay dominant – halting
competitors before they get too big. So, for example, when Facebook purchased 
Instagram for about $1 billion and WhatsApp for $21.8 billion, we as a society lost 
the ability to have these two businesses grow to be a company that can actually com-
pete with Facebook.237 Similarly, when Google bought Android for $50 million, 
Waze for $1 billion, or YouTube for $1.65 billion to prevent them from further grow-
ing and competing with it, Google was able to remain dominant.238 And Amazon 
killed much of its competition with purchases such as the Whole Foods acquisition,
which was entirely aligned with Amazon’s desire to deliver more aspects of its cus-
tomers’ daily lives. Groceries are one of the few goods that are purchased with high 
regularity, and Whole Foods was the gateway to this new market.239 Likewise, in 
addition to acquiring the competition, the tech giants’ size and business models also
hurt competition and reduce innovation as they create a chilling effect on funding of 
small startups. Indeed, investors are aware of the tech giants’ potential ability to out-
man, out-fund, and immediately compete with any new innovative player, and are 
wary of that. So, these new players have a hard time getting financial support, and
we should not be surprised of the continued dominance of a very few companies like 
Facebook, Google, Amazon, Apple and Microsoft.
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But in addition to the antitrust issues, there are other negative, economic-wide 
externalities caused by the technology industry, including systemic risks related to 
critical infrastructure. It would undoubtedly be more than inconvenient for most in-
dividuals, institutions, and businesses if Google were to disappear, and it would prob-
ably take a long time before internet infrastructure—especially services related to 
emails, searches, and maps—regained the same levels of usefulness and productivity. 
But that is not the worst that could happen. Inherent risk is involved when govern-
ment agencies, businesses, and individuals move increasing amounts of computing 
and data to shared services. Individually, the changes to outsourced services may 
represent low risk. Taken together, the stored financial or government information, 
dependent on a few too-big-to-fail entities, could represent a tremendous risk to the 
overall economy.240 This was not the case with Microsoft or IBM. It is clear why the 
EU subjects digital service providers—of online marketplaces, online search en-
gines, and cloud computing services—to critical infrastructure’s legal security re-
quirements, while excluding, per the NIS Directive, “hardware manufacturers and 
software developers”241 such as IBM or Microsoft. 
The speed of change in computer and communications technologies and its impact 
on economic, social, and cultural structures make a difference as well. Past events 
may not offer the best guidance regarding the future,242 as both technology and cyber 
threats are evolving quickly. Reliable internet, digital services, and other network 
and IT facilities are essential in recovering from most large-scale disasters. As a so-
ciety, we must prioritize detailed preparations to withstand and recover from a wide 
range of unwanted cyber events, both accidental and deliberate.243
2. Financial Links and Contagion 
The inextricable links between physical and cyberinfrastructures also validate 
Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0 as a concern. Infrastructure has become increasingly interde-
pendent with essential services, increasing the possibility of cascading effects if a 
single sector is disrupted. This is especially demonstrated by the financial sector’s 
reliance on the key digital service providers’ cloud services, as well as other services. 
Understanding and mitigating these risks is key to our national security, resilience, 
and economic prosperity.  
Indeed, businesses across different industries today are so interconnected and in-
terdependent that hackers attack the advanced cybersecurity systems of bigger busi-
nesses by turning to smaller companies without vigorous protection.244 These smaller 
businesses may be contractors for larger entities or third- party vendors, may be 
directly responsible for critical infrastructure, or may hold data that could be valuable 
                                                                                                                
240. See Treese, supra note 109. 
241. See JONES DAY, THE NEW EU CYBERSECURITY DIRECTIVE: WHAT IMPACT ON DIGITAL 
SERVICE PROVIDERS? (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
242. PETER SOMMER & IAN BROWN, REDUCING SYSTEMIC CYBERSECURITY RISK 5 (2011), 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/46889922.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB88-F5ER]. 
243. Id.
244. Introduction to Cybersecurity, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov 
/managing-business/cybersecurity/introduction-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/HD3G-
JJUF]. 
1258 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:1211 
to hackers. For example, the hack into the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
was the result of IT system access through a third party.245  
Additionally, and unrelatedly, in recent years, the key digital service providers 
have started to situate themselves as instrumental financial service providers, offer-
ing more and more consumers, especially millennials and underbanked and un-
banked populations, access to financial services. These services have included credit 
and creditworthiness evaluations, loans, payment transfers, cash alternatives, and 
even money accounts of different sorts. Some, including Facebook, for example, 
have even gone as far as acquiring regulatory banking licenses.246
V. REGULATORY MEASURES AND POTENTIAL RESPONSES
The increasing sophistication and scope of data breaches in general have caused 
federal and state regulators to pay closer attention to cybersecurity. In the United 
States, several federal agencies have started issuing guidelines for avoiding these 
dangers. A notable example is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
which in 2014 hosted a Cybersecurity Roundtable where it emphasized the signifi-
cance of cybersecurity to the integrity of the market system and customer-data pro-
tection.247 A month later, the SEC began its cybersecurity initiative, stressing its ob-
jectives: to gain a better understanding of the cybersecurity risks in the securities 
industry and to help firms prepare for and respond to these risks. Similarly, the Office 
of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) published a Risk Alert with a 
series of assessments to identify cybersecurity risks248 and measure cybersecurity 
preparedness in the securities industry. In 2015, the OCIE published summary ob-
servations of the results.249 Because of the extreme and constantly growing im-
portance of cybersecurity and the affirmative response from broker-dealers and ad-
visers to OCIE’s efforts, the OCIE announced a focus on cybersecurity compliance 
and controls as part of its 2015 Examination Priorities.250  
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Similarly, as discussed above, President Obama issued presidential policy direc-
tives and signed executive orders tackling this issue—admittedly following discus-
sions in recent years of the government’s involvement in preventing cybersecurity 
attacks, and its responsibility for fixing the damage they cause. Additionally, law-
makers have tried, not always successfully, to advance the issues of cybersecurity, 
regularly introducing information-sharing bills in both the Senate and the House; in 
October 2015, the Senate passed the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act,251 at-
tempting to encourage the flow of cyber threat data between the private sector and 
the government.252
These regulatory attempts are not surprising. Changes must be made to the exist-
ing fundamental regulatory framework to ensure that undesired risks relevant to key 
digital service providers are monitored, minimized, and mitigated. In the financial 
sector, the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to make SIFIs safer and solve the too-big-to-
fail problem.253 Nevertheless, several years after its enactment, it seems that it has 
failed, allowing the government to give financial support, which might be similar to 
bailouts, framed in a general fashion.254 Also, as noted earlier, entities beyond SIFIs 
can cause a too-big-to-fail impact.255  
In the case of Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0 resulting in a national emergency, different 
forms of government intervention are possible. For example, in Netflix’s third season 
of House of Cards, President Underwood (played by Kevin Spacey) invoked the 
(real) Stafford Act256 to declare unemployment a disastrous national emergency and 
use funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for his job-
creation program—a (fictional) stretch, to be sure, but one that might inform re-
sponses to cybersecurity-related catastrophes.  
One thing is clear, however: all legal responses must be carefully designed. After 
all, even initiatives such as the EU’s NIS Directive, meant to institute the first set of 
baseline cybersecurity requirements for Critical Service Providers, are likely to have 
unintended consequences. The Directive’s impact, for example, is likely to go less 
noticed in the near future: member states have twenty-one months to transpose the 
Directive’s new rules into their national laws and six more to identify operators of 
essential services by each member state. At that point, each member state crafts an 
interpretation of the legislation to be incorporated into its laws. Just as the Dodd-
Frank Act’s SIFI designation was interpreted as governmental approval of SIFIs as 
too big to fail, entities that the EU would identify as critical digital service providers 
might de facto be seen as too big to fail. This market perception could then lead to 
the creation of all sorts of undesired and unethical incentives. 
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CONCLUSION
From the standpoint of domination and power, a central problem in today’s polit-
ical economy is what Brandeis famously called the “curse of bigness”257—in partic-
ular, the concentrated private power of digital service providers in the information 
economy. Currently, key digital service providers increasingly control the terms of 
access and distribution for major cyber-social systems and services.258 This power, 
in combination with cybersecurity threats to which such entities are exposed, and the 
potential consequences, is worrisome. 
In the past several years, public discussions of too-big-to-fail have asked the fol-
lowing questions: If a specific entity fails, would the effects of the failure on our 
technological, economic, and social lives be so dire that the government would be 
required to get involved? What consequences would there be for the ecosystem of 
customers, service providers, competitors, employees, and others parties partaking 
in the marketplace? The goal is to prevent a situation where there is a risk of damage 
to the larger system from the breakdown of one participant in the system.  
Traditionally, the technology industry has not faced this issue, as the assumption 
has been that technology companies come and go, acquiring others or being acquired, 
their clients transitioning as needed.259 Damages resulting from failures of one com-
pany’s products or services, which could impact the entire company’s stability and 
business, have yet to produce ripple effects, and the impact on the overall system has 
been limited. This Article argues, however, that this may no longer be the case, con-
sidering the key digital service providers’ size, power, and importance; horizontal 
and vertical integration; overall impact on our technological, economic, and cyber-
social systems; and the damaging potential of cyberattacks. Indeed, when taking ad-
vantage of Microsoft’s software vulnerabilities in May 2017, attackers were able to 
disrupt operations in more than 150 countries, lock up more than 200,000 computers, 
and cause damage that was estimated in the billions of dollars260—and much worse 
attacks exposing the big digital service providers’ vulnerabilities still await.  
Arguing that the too-big-to-fail concept may be relevant to key, albeit nonfinan-
cial, digital service providers, given the massive externalities on the general public 
that their failure would impose, this Article seeks to draw attention to the entities that 
might constitute Critical Service Providers. It also calls for the private sector and
scholars to help regulators advance initiatives to address this problem, create guide-
lines as to how to better manage the risk at such entities, and determine the best 
measures to increase the stability and safety of the relevant entities, as well as the 
overall economy. But in order for such a systemic approach to take place, the conse-
quences for designating entities as Critical Service Providers should also be clearly 
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defined and include further scrutiny and regulation conducted by some type of a su-
pervisory body, which should be the product of a collaborative private-public initia-
tive. 
The private sector must be involved in designing this systemic approach for sev-
eral reasons. First, in the United States, the private sector controls most of the critical 
infrastructure, although the government has a national security interest in safeguard-
ing those assets. And there is a gap between the public sector’s desire to safeguard 
the critical infrastructure from low-probability catastrophe and the private sector’s 
desire to spend a lot of money to minimize the likelihood of it happening, without 
utilizing a cost-effective, risk-based approach to defend against threats. In order to 
guarantee that the private sector properly manages risks against all cyber threats, the 
input of lawmakers and experts in such initiatives is key, despite the private sector’s 
persuasive argument against overregulation.261 Second, the challenge lies in fostering 
the right set of economic, political, and societal checks and balances that could curb 
key digital service providers’ influence while not overregulating them. In the after-
math of the 2008 financial crisis, a wide range of financial-technology companies 
have emerged to offer alternative services and investments to consumers demanding 
more transparency, with the blessing of regulators. The same consumer-driven revo-
lution in the technology industry would severely undermine AFAMA’s ability to rule 
the sector, as many worry they are aiming to do,262 without overburdening them. 
Third, although the Dodd-Frank Act’s living wills are mainly a costly disclosure re-
quirement that is difficult to effectively implement263 rather than a substantive regu-
latory solution that solves the too-big-to-fail problem, the living wills do add some 
value by requiring entities to enhance their risk management and plan better for the 
unknown,264 including in connection with cybersecurity, as advocated recently by 
former Pentagon cybersecurity expert, Dr. Michael Sulmeyer.265 Finally, and most 
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importantly, across the technology sector, companies are already racing to provide 
stronger cybersecurity protection for customers, including from nation-states, but 
they cannot successfully do so on their own, especially as governments are increasing 
their investments in offensive cyber capabilities. Therefore, it must be recognized 
that this is not a problem that the public sector or the private sector can solve acting 
alone.266
Pushing for this type of a collaboration between the private and the public sectors 
was also a presidential cybersecurity commission’s preferred course of action, as in-
dicated in the commission’s report. Action Item 1.1.1 begins: “The President should 
direct senior federal executives to launch a private-public initiative, including provi-
sions to [enable] agile, coordinated responses and mitigation of attacks on the users 
and the nation’s network infrastructure.”267 The report repeatedly emphasizes the 
need for collaborative public-private partnership, rather than plain rulemaking.268
If the process of planning is well conceived,269 risk management can give entities 
a competitive advantage, become a profit center,270 and help focus efforts on areas 
where business strategies fall short of best practice,271 while preventing a Too-Big-
To-Fail 2.0 situation. 
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